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INTRODUCTION

In the last twenty years, technology in the medical industry has witnessed
unprecedented growth in the area of prenatal detection of congenital birth
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This includes the genesis of amniocentesis, ultrasonography, and

other procedures to detect possible problems with fetal development. 2 Occasionally a physician uses this technology in a negligent manner so that parents are deprived of their limited, but constitutionally protected, option to
abort a seriously defective child. Most jurisdictions, including Texas, allow
the parents to recover from the negligent physician for special damages, such
as medical and educational expenses resulting from the child's birth, in a suit
for negligent genetic counseling. 3 Yet, the Texas Supreme Court has held
that the child born as a result of this negligence has suffered no compensable
injury by being born impaired because, as a matter of law, life is always
preferred over nonlife.4
If the parents are unable to sue, or if the child has reached majority, Texas
and several other jurisdictions leave the child without remedy.5 Because of
this possibility, even if the boundaries of Texas tort law must be expanded,
justice requires an assured remedy for all victims of a physician's negligence.6 This comment will discuss the background and history of the child's
1. See STEADMAN'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 311 (5th ed. 1982) (congenital defect one that exists at birth); see also Rogers, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth: Medical
Malpracticein Genetic Counselingand Prenatal Testing, 33 S.C.L. REV. 713, 715 n.15 (1982).
Some defects may be hereditary, which are transmitted from one or both of the parent's genes
to the child, such as Down's Syndrome and Tay-Sachs disease. See id at 715 n. 15. Other
types of genetic defects are not hereditary, but are caused by exposure of an otherwise healthy
fetus to harmful effects, such as radiation, chemicals, or natural infection, such as rubella. See
id. at 715 n.15.
2. See Friedman, Legal Implications of Amniocentesis, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 92, 97 (1974)
(amniocentesis process consists of extracting anmiotic fluid from mother; serves to identify sex,
blood type, chromosomal abnormalities, and many possible genetic defects). Ultrasonography
is a process using reflection of sound waves to define and locate internal structures. See
STEADMAN'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1511 (5th ed. 1982). Fetoscopy adds an
optical system to the amniocentesis procedure. See Comment, Fatherand Mother Know Best:
Defining the Liability of Physiciansfor Inadequate Genetic Counseling, 87 YALE L. REV. 1488,
1493 n.22 (1978).
3. See, e.g., Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471, 473 (7th Cir. 1981) (recovery by parents for negligence in failing to diagnose possible defects); Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d
718, 719 (Ala. 1982) (parents awarded damages upon proper proof on remand); Jacobs v.
Thermer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 850 (Tex. 1975) (parents can recover for economic burden occasioned by negligent genetic counseling).
4. See Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 924-25 (Tex. 1984) (court held no cause of
action for wrongful life, supporting holding with assertion of sanctity of human life) (citing
Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900 (1978)).
5. See, e.g., Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537, 544 (D.S.C. 1980) (wrongful birth
damages given to parent, but child may not recover); Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022, 1025,
1027 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (parents given damages, but child not allowed recovery); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 925 (Tex. 1984) (parent's wrongful birth action recognized,
child denied wrongful life claim).
6. Cf W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 3-4 (5th ed.
1984). The text provides:
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cause of action for negligent genetic counseling, which provides such a remedy. Further, it will explore the status of this tort, commonly known as
wrongful life, and other prenatal torts in Texas. Finally, this comment will
analyze the recent Texas Supreme Court decision not to recognize a wrongful life action and will assert an argument for adoption of the cause of action
in Texas.
II. BACKGROUND: THE TORT OF WRONGFUL LIFE IN AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE

A.

Distinguishingthe Child's Cause of Action

In recent years, there has been a profusion of decisions in the areas denominated wrongful pregnancy, wrongful birth, and wrongful life. Some
courts and commentators, however, have never quite differentiated these distinct causes of action, often using the terms interchangeably. 7 These suits
involve both different parties and claims and must therefore be
distinguished.
An action for wrongful pregnancy is usually brought by the parents alleging that a physician in some way negligently caused the unplanned birth of a
child.' This cause of action arises in most instances from a negligent failure
to diagnose pregnancy when there is still time for abortion,9 from an unsuc-

The law of torts is anyNew and nameless torts are being recognized constantly ....
thing but static and the limits of its development are never set. When it becomes clear
that the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection against the conduct of the defendant, the mere fact that the claim is novel will not of itself operate as a bar to the
remedy.
Id. § 1, at 3-4.
7. See Comment, Curlender-Bio Science Laboratories: Recognition of a New Cause ofAction for "Wrongful Life", 25 ST. Louis U.L.J. 455, 455 n.l (1981) (despite difference between
actions, confusion still exists); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 811, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895,
899 (1978) (reference to child's cause of action as wrongful birth, which is, in fact, parents'
cause of action); see also Robertson, Toward Rational Boundariesof Tort Liability for Injury to
the Unborn: Prenatal Injuries, Preconception Injuries and Wrongful Life, 1978 DUKE L.J.
1401, 1439-40 (reference to actions brought by parents, as well as children, as "wrongful life"
actions); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1446 (5th ed. 1979) (no differentiation between parents'
cause of action and that of child).
8. See Hickman v. Myers, 632 S.W.2d 869, 869 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (woman suing physician for failed sterilization attempt); Note, One More Mouth to
Feed: A Look at Physician'sLiabilityfor the Negligent Performanceof Sterilization Operations,
25 ARIz. L. REV. 1069, 1069 (1983) ("wrongful pregnancy" used to describe action by parents
seeking compensation for birth of healthy child).
9. See, e.g., Clapman v. Yanga, 300 N.W.2d 727, 729-34 (Mich. 1980) (negligent failure
to diagnose pregnancy, court awards all child rearing costs); Anonymous v. Sapega, 392
N.Y.S.2d 79, 79 (App. Div. 1977) (negligent failure to diagnose pregnancy in rape victim);
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cessful abortion," or as a result of a negligently performed sterilization
operation.1
A suit for wrongful birth is similarly brought by the parents of an unplanned child.12 In a wrongful birth action, the parents claim is that the physician's wrongful genetic counseling deprived them of a choice on whether to
bear a defective child or to seek an abortion.
This situation usually occurs
when genetic tests designed to discover possible fetal defects are not supplied, 14 when tests are given but are negligently performed," or when the

Ziemba v. Sternberg, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265, 269 (App. Div. 1974) (negligent failure to diagnose
pregnancy).
10. See, e.g., Stills v. Gratton, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652, 658-59 (Ct. App. 1976) (plaintiff can
recover all costs available under tort law for failed abortion); Wilczynski v. Goodman, 391
N.E.2d 479, 487-88 (Ill. 1979) (plaintiff allowed damages for medical expenses due to failure of
therapeutic abortion, but cost of raising unwanted child disallowed); Speck v. Finegold, 408
A.2d 496, 508-09 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (after failure of both sterilization and abortion, court
allowed recovery for medical expenses). But see Nanke v. Napier, 346 N.W.2d 520, 523 (Iowa
1984) (failed abortion, parents cannot recover for rearing of healthy child). See generally
Comment, Wrongful Birth: Fact Patterns Giving Rise to Causes of Action Distinguished and
Discussed, 4 HAMLINE L. REV. 59, 101-03 (1980) (detailed analysis of wrongful pregnancy
actions brought after failed abortions).
11. See, e.g., LaPoint v. Shirley, 409 F. Supp. 118, 121 (W.D. Tex. 1976) (in negligently
performed sterilization action parents allowed medical costs, but costs of rearing child denied);
Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822, 823-24 (Fla. 1984) (rearing costs not allowed for healthy
child, not even ordinary expenses for impaired child, but parents may recover special upbringing costs after negligent sterilization operation); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169,
170-71 (Minn. 1977) (failed vasectomy, court allowed pre- and post-natal costs, pain and suffering damages, and reasonable costs of raising child). See generally Comment, Civil Liability
Arisingfrom "Wrongful Birth" Followingan Unsuccessful Sterilization Operation, 4 AM. J.L. &
MED. 131,
135-37 (1978) (list of U.S. and foreign cases on negligently performed
sterilizations).
12. Compare Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1975) (parents sought recovery for being denied chance to make informed decision about birth) with Hickman v. Myers,
632 S.W.2d 869, 870 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ) (parents sought damages for
failed sterilization operation).
13. See Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1975) (parents brought wrongful
birth suit for negligent genetic counseling by physician); Comment, Wrongful Birth: The
Emerging Status of a New Tort, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 140, 145 (1976) (wrongful birth suit parents' cause of action; wrongful life action by harmed child); see also Comment, "Wrongful
Life": The Right Not to Be Born, 54 TUL. L. REV. 480, 484 (1980). When these claims are
brought by the parents, the usual allegation is that had the parents been properly advised they
would have avoided conception or aborted the child. See id. at 484. The parents often seek
recovery for expenses incurred in raising the child, as well as for their own mental and physical
pain and suffering. See id. at 484; see also Comment, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth
Causes of Action-Suggestionsfor a ConsistentAnalysis, 63 MARQ. L. REV. 611, 612-13 (1980)
(wrongful birth claim based on failure to provide information, not that doctor could have
prevented birth defects).
14. See, e.g., Schroeder v. Perkel, 432 A.2d 834, 835 (N.J. 1981) (physician failed to
perform "sweat test" which would have revealed cystic fibrosis in first child); Howard v.
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physician fails to warn of possible side effects of maternal disease. 6
In a wrongful life action, the child seeks damages for the lifetime of pain
inflicted by the physician's failure to provide the parents with information
necessary to reach an informed decision on whether to abort their fetus."
Thus, wrongful life is the cause of action by the child, separate and distinct
from any recovery by the parents,
but containing virtually the same essential
18

allegations as wrongful birth.
One dissimilarity between wrongful birth and wrongful life is that whereas
most courts recognize that wrongful birth fits within the general tort framework of duty, breach, causation, and damages, the courts have not found
this so for wrongful life.' 9 Recent cases and commentaries, however, support the theory that the child's action for negligent genetic counseling, or
"wrongful life," also conforms to traditional tort standards.2 ° If these stan-

Lecher, 366 N.E.2d 64, 65, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363, 364 (1977) (physician failed to perform amniocentesis to discover possibility of Tay-Sachs disease); Johnson v. Yeshiva Univ., 364 N.E.2d
1340, 1341, 396 N.Y.S.2d 647, 648 (1977) (physican failed to perform amniocentesis). See
generally Comment, Wrongful Birth: A Child of Tort Comes to Age, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 65, 66
(1981) (wrongful birth cause of action arises when physician fails to perform tests for fetal
defects).
15. See, e.g., Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692, 694 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (negligent testing for Tay-Sachs disease); Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 956, 182 Cal.
Rptr. 337, 339 (1982) (negligently performed hearing test on first child, second child born with
identical hereditary deafness); Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 479
(Ct. App. 1980) (physician misdiagnosed parents as noncarriers of Tay-Sachs disease). See
generally Comment, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth Causes of Action-Suggestions for a
Consistent Analysis, 63 MARQ. L. REV. 611, 621-22 (1980) (wrongful birth action can be
brought when failure to test for genetic problem occurs through lack of amniocentesis and
otherwise).
16. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 690 (N.J. 1967) (failure to diagnose
and warn of danger of rubella to fetus); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 486
(Wash. 1983) (failure to discern possible adverse result to child caused by drug used to control
epilepsy); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372, 373 (Wis. 1975) (failure to diagnose
rubella in pregnant mother). See generally Comment, Wrongful Birth: Fact Patterns Giving
rise to Causes of Action Distinguished and Discussed, 4 HAMLINE L. REV. 59, 62-66 (1980)
(detailed discussion of cases where physician failed to warn of side effects of rubella).
17. See Rogers, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth: Medical Malpractice in Genetic
Counseling and PrenatalTesting, 33 S.C.L. REV. 713, 716 (1982).
18. See Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692, 695 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
(damages sustained by parents separate and distinct from those of child); Peters & Peters,
Wrongful Life: Recognizing the Defective Child's Right to a Cause of Action, 18 DuQ. L. REV.
857, 857 n.2 (1980) (any suit brought by parents for their injuries separate and distinct from
child's suit).
19. See Rogers, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth: Medical Malpractice in Genetic
Counseling and Prenatal Testing, 33 S.C.L. REV. 713, 749 (1982) (unanimity among courts
that wrongful birth within traditional tort requirements).
20. See, e.g., Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 959-60, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 342-43 (1982)
(cause of action for wrongful life fits within standard tort framework); Capron, Tort Liability
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dards can be established, courts could no longer as easily refuse such cases
on the ground that they state no cause of action. 1 An analysis of each of the
elements of negligent genetic counseling is appropriate in showing the reasons for allowing the child a cause of action.
B. Negligent Genetic Counseling and Its Place Within the Tort
Framework
1. Duty
Physicians have long had a duty to provide treatment that conforms in
quality to that given by similarly situated professionals. 22 Although some
cases and commentators have denied that this duty extends to the unborn
child,2" three theories exist that would support this extension of duty. One
recognizes a duty based on the foreseeable nature of the injury, another does
so as an extension of the duty owed the parents, and the third holds that the
physician's duty is owed directly to the fetus.
First, it is foreseeable to a physician that the birth of an impaired child
could be the result of improper medical advice and counseling.2 4 Obviously,
in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 618, 683-84 (1979) (recovery by child comports
with traditional ideas of tort law); Note, Wrongful Life: A Modern Claim Which Conforms to
the Traditional Tort Framework, 20 WM. & MARY L. REV. 125, 155 (1978) (despite denial of
cause of action, wrongful life within tort framework).
21. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 1967) (no cause of action
since damages not ascertainable); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895,
900 (1978) (no cognizable damages at law, therefore no cause of action); Stewart v. Long
Island College Hosp., 313 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (App. Div. 1970) (no cause of action cognizable
at law), affid, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972).
22. Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 848 (Tex. 1975) (physician has duty to disclose
results of diagnosis and attendant risks as reasonable practitioner would have); W. PROSSER &
W.P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 187 (5th ed. 1984) (doctor must use care and skill
as would ordinary member in good standing of his profession).
23. See, e.g., Elliot v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546, 548 (Ala. 1978) (parental right to abortion
does not lead to right not to be born); Comment, The Trend Towards Wrongful Life: A Dissenting View, 31 UCLA L. REV. 473, 486 (1983) (incomprehensible to have duty to child to
keep it from being born); Note, Torts- Wrongful Life-No Cause of Action For Failure to
Inform Parentsof Possible Birth Defects, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 750, 756 (1967) (duty to parents
alone since they are only ones capable of acting on information given). But see Phillips v.
United States, 508 F. Supp. 537, 542 (D.S.C. 1980) (in suit by child, little doubt that third
party may have duty to unborn child); Note, A Cause of Action for "Wrongful Life": A Suggested Analysis, 55 MINN. L. REV. 58, 70 (1970) (duty to child not precluded by law merely
because fetal state inhibits action on information).
24. See Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 496 (Wash. 1983) (duty to extend to
foreseeable persons; as objects of genetic counseling, future children foreseeable); see also Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (Ill. 1977) (child has right to be born without
injuries foreseeably caused by breach of duty to child's mother); cf Comment, Wrongful Life:
The Right to Be Born,, 54 TUL. L. REV. 480, 489 (1980) (several cases allow child recovery for
being "foreseeable victim" of negligence by physician).
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the physician owes a duty to the parents since they rely on the advice in
making their decision.2 5 If the physician should have discovered genetic
problems, but failed to, this approach suggests the duty is owed to the impaired child since his birth is a direct consequence of the breach.2 6
A second approach presumes the existence of a two-fold decisionmaking
process in determining whether to abort an impaired child.2 7 One decision
concerns the parents and their subjective desire or ability to bear an afflicted
child.28 The second consists of the child's right to determine whether he
prefers an impaired condition over life, a decision which has legal support in
similar contexts.29 Since the child is unable to make this choice, the parents
are given the power to make a "substituted" decision in their best judgment
on his behalf.3 ° When negligent genetic counseling has been provided, an
informed decision by the parent, and the child through the parent, is therefore precluded.3 1

25. See Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 850 (Tex. 1975) (duty to inform parents;
valid cause of action for failure to do so); Comment, "Wrongful Life": Should the Cause of
Action Be Recognized, 70 Ky. L.J. 163, 173 (198 1-1982) (recognizes action of parent for failure
to disclose relevant genetic information).
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311, at 106 (1965). Section 311 provides

that a person may be subject to liability if he gives negligent and false information to a person
whom he knows will rely on the information. See id. § 311, at 106. He will be responsible for
injury resulting to the person he tells and also to any third person that the "actor should
expect to be put in peril by the actions taken." See id. § 311, at 106; Comment, "Wrongful
Life": The Right Not to Be Born, 54 TUL. L. REV. 480, 490-91 (1980) (foreseeable that when
faulty information given, parents will decide to give birth and, further, that child will be impaired); see also Comment, Genetic Counseling and Medical Malpractice; Recognizing a Cause
of Action for Wrongful Life, 8 T. MAR. L. REV. 154, 169 (1983) (impaired birth foreseeable
consequence of breach of genetic counseling duty).
27. See Comment, A Preference for Nonexistence: Wrongful Life and a Proposed Tort of
Genetic Malpractice, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 477, 492 (1982) (parent has right to avoid birth of
defective child; further, since child incompetent to decide for itself, parents have "substituted"
judgment for child).
28. See id. at 493.
29. Cf Goldstein & Hirsh, Wrongful Life, 1983 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 279, 284. The
rights of the child in cases of wrongful genetic counseling are very similar to the rights of a
comatose or terminally ill patient in the "right to die" cases. See id. at 284; In re Guardianship
of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (family members may decide nonlife
prefereable to life); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663-64 (N.J. 1976) (denial of parent/guardian
right to decide on child's continued existence breach of child's right of self-determination),
cert. denied sub non Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
30. See Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 769 (N.J. 1984) (Handler, J., concurring
& dissenting) (child's right of personal autonomy in hands of parent); Comment, Genetic Counseling
and Medical Malpractice: Recognizing a Cause of Action for Wrongful Life, 8 T. MAR. L.
REV. 154, 169-70 (1983) (child allowed but unable to choose nonexistence, thus parents should
have discretionary power).
31. See Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 618, 660 (1979)
(failure to provide information on genetic risks breaches duty to parents and child). An im-
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Finally, several commentators have proposed that the duty to provide correct information is owed to the parent and the child since each are pptients
of the physician. 32 This approach is in line with the theory that the unborn
child is a "person" from the moment of conception.3 3
2.

Breach

Breach, in a negligent genetic counseling action, is the actual failure by the
physician to properly inform the parents as to the existence of foreseeable
genetic risks, thus depriving both parents and child of an informed decision. 34 Since the child's and the parents' cause of action arise from the same
occurrence, the breach of duty is essentially the same in both actions. 35 The
fact that a child is born impaired is not necessarily an indicia of negligence,
however, since the plaintiffs must still prove that the physician breached his
duty of due care, that is, he knew or should have known of a genetic
problem. 6
paired child has the right to choose death over impaired existence, but the child's parents
should have the same right to decide since the child is unable to do so. See Comment, A
Preferencefor Nonexistence: Wrongful Life and a Proposed Tort of Genetic Malpractice, 55 S.
CAL. L. REV. 477, 493-94 (1982) (parents have ability to substitute their decision for their
child, thus duty to one is duty to both). The essence of the situation is in the nature of an
agency relationship, with the parents having power to make decisions for the child. See Comment, Birth-Defective Infants: A Standardfor Nontreatment Decisions, 30 STAN. L. REV. 599,
609-10 (1978) (parents have primary-decision control since child cannot make own decision or
determine its best interest).
32. See Comment, "Wrongful Life' The Right Not to Be Born, 54 TUL. L. REV. 480,
489 (1980) (physician owes separate duty to child); see also Comment, Genetic Counseling and
Medical Malpractice;Recognizing a Cause ofAction for Wrongful Life, 8 T. MAR. L. REV. 154,
169 (1983) (physician's duty to use reasonable care extends to both mother and child).
33. See Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 140 (D.D.C. 1946) (property and criminal law
consider child "person" from conception; negligence should not be treated differently).
34. See Rogers, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth: Medical Malpractice in Genetic
Counselingand Prenatal Testing, 33 S.C.L. REV. 713, 732 (1982) (physicians required to provide counseling and testing only where risks make genetic problems foreseeable; plaintiff must
still show breach of standard of care); see also Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483,
496 (Wash. 1983) (duty breached by not conforming to standard of care). The question of
whether a breach has occurred must include consideration of the actual steps taken by the
genetic counselor. See Comment, Father and Mother Know Best: Defining the Liability of
Physiciansfor InadequateGenetic Counseling, 87 YALE L.J. 1488, 1504-05 (1978) (sufficiency
and accuracy of steps taken determine what constitues breach).
35. See Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 760 (N.J. 1984) (causes of action for negligent
genetic counseling same but denominated differently; breach exists as to parent).
36. See Trotzig, The Defective Child and the Actions for Wrongful Life and Wrongful
Birth, 14 FAM. L.Q. 15, 22 (1980) (plaintiff must prove conduct of physician was below appropriate standard of care). The question of whether a breach of duty has occurred is dependent
upon the facts, as the standard of care fluctuates under different circumstances. See W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 174 (5th ed. 1984) (uniform rules of
conduct not possible in negligence law).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol16/iss3/6

8

Parker: Wrongful Life: The Child's Cause of Action for Negligent Genetic

COMMENTS

19851

3. Causation
For causation to be present, the plaintiff must show that there is some
tangible connection between the injury suffered and the conduct of the defendant.37 One early case held that causation could not exist in genetic
counseling actions because there was no connection between the negligence
of the physician and the existence of birth defects, which would have occurred regardless of the negligence.3" The modem view, however, is that
causation in a negligent genetic counseling action is not that the physician
caused the birth defects, but that he denied the parents an informed choice.39
Direct causation is satisfied if the parents prove that they would have obtained an abortion had this choice been given them."° Proximate causation
is also present if it is determined that denial of the choice makes the birth of
an impaired child foreseeable.4 1
4.

Damages

Courts have occasionally struggled with the first three elements of negligent genetic counseling actions, but no fiercer debate has occurred than that
37. See W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 263 (5th ed. 1984).
There are two elements of causation: one is "but for" or direct causation, which factually
determines whether the result complained of would have occurred but for the defendant's acts.
See id. § 41, at 263. The second is proximate cause, which is a question of law on whether
liability should extend to the defendant, or if he had a duty to plaintiff under the circumstances. See id. § 42, at 272-73.
38. See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 691-92 (N.J. 1967) (physician did not produce, nor could he have done anything to prevent, likelihood of disease).
39. See, e.g., Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537, 542 (D.S.C. 1980) (in suit by
child, gravamen of complaint is deprivation of choice); Rogers, Wrongful Life and Wrongful
Birth: Medical Malpractice in Genetic Counseling and Prenatal Testing, 33 S.C.L. REV. 713,
734 (1982) (wrongful life claim based on birth of child after negligent failure to inform); Comment, "Wrongful Life": Should the Cause of Action Be Recognized?, 70 Ky. L.J. 163, 177
(1981-1982) (action not for causing defects, but for causing life with defects by depriving parental choice) (emphasis in original),
40. See Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692, 695 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
(complaint shows sufficient link between negligence and failure to abort); Comment, "Wrongful Life": The Right Not to Be Born, 54 TUL. L. REv. 480, 491 (1980) (if "but-for" defendant's
negligence parents would have obtained abortion, causation satisfied); cf Comment, A Cause
of Action For "Wrongful Life": A Suggested Analysis, 55 MINN. L. REV. 58, 73 (1970) (question of whether parents would have availed themselves of knowledge should be fact question
for jury).
41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 290, at 47 (1965). To determine whether a
counselor's conduct is a risk, he is deemed to know the "qualities and habits of human beings."
See id. § 290, at 417. When the parents visit a genetic counselor specifically to determine the
possibility of genetic problems, and false information is given, foreseeability that a child will be
born deformed seems to be present. See Park v. Chessin, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110, 113 (App. Div.
1977) (foreseeable that parents would rely on superior knowledge of physicians), rev'd sub
nom. Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
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over the question of damages.42 One early decision involving wrongful life
supported the idea that a proper measure of damages could not be reached
due to the inability to quantify the injury.4 3 This rationale is no longer
deemed controlling, however, as today the real problem exists in determining whether an injury has occurred at all, that is, whether the birth of a
defective child can result in injury cognizable at law.' There is universal
agreement among courts that the child cannot recover general damages, due
to the "impossibility" of making the necessary comparison required by compensatory damage law.45 It has been held by some courts that such a comparison must necessarily involve weighing life and nonlife, which the law is
not prepared to do.4 6 Dissension occurs, however, when this identical theory is used to bar claims for special damages.4 7 For example, the New
Jersey Supreme Court originally adhered to the "comparison" theory to
deny any damage recovery to a child, only to reverse itself five years later by
allowing a special damage award. 48 The court ruled that special damages
were not speculative and, thus, allowed full recovery of medical and educational costs for the child.4 9
In order to avoid the problems caused by the "comparison" theory of
damages, two separate means of determining damages have been proposed
by several writers. The first operates by assigning a "plus" value to life with-

42. See Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 496 (Wash. 1983) (extent of damages and presence of injury most controversial elements); Comment, Wrongful Life and a FundamentalRight to Be Born Healthy: Park v. Chessin;Becker v. Schwartz, 27 BUFFALO L. REV.
537, 555 (1978) (damages are major legal obstacle to child's claim for negligent genetic
counseling).
43. See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 1967) (difficulty in measuring
damages when child brings action for negligent genetic counseling).
44. See Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 12 (N.J. 1979) (difficulty in measuring damages no
longer overwhelming problem); see also Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 165 Cal. Rptr.
477, 486 (Ct. App. 1980) (gradual shift away from denying wrongful life damages due to difficulty of measurement).
45. See Elliot v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546, 548 (Ala. 1978) (impossible to measure damages
and no infringement of any legal rights); Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 12 (N.J. 1979) (no
damages possible since no cognizable injury).
46. See Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900 (1978) (damage
calculation depends on comparison untenable at law).
47. Compare id. at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900 (impossibility of comparison bars any damage recovery by child) with Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 348
(1982) (nonexistence-existence argument prevents general damage recovery, but special damages award not prevented).
48. Compare Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 12 (N.J. 1979) (computation required impossible, child can recover no damages) with Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 762-63 (N.J. 1984)
(insurmountable problems only in determining general damages; special damages may be
awarded).
49. See Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 762 (N.J. 1984) (child allowed special damage
recovery since damages readily ascertainable).
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out defects, a "zero" value to nonexistence, and a "minus" value to life with
defects.50 The monetary value of the "plus" and "minus" figures are added
together, with the resulting sum being the amount of compensatory damages. 51 Under most circumstances, the number obtained will be "positive"
and no damages will be awarded. 2 Yet, as the impairment becomes more
severe, the "minus" value may preponderate and damages will be
ascertainable. 3
The second theory of recovery proposed by commentators concerns the
"benefit" rule of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.54 The provision states
that when both a benefit and an injury result from a defendant's conduct, the
monetary value of the benefit will mitigate the damage award.5 5 In the negligent genetic counseling situation, this would entail finding what monetary
injury has occurred to the child, then subtracting
this amount from the de56
termined value of benefit from being born.
Even with the satisfaction of all the elements of a cause of action, there
has been reluctance to allow a child recovery.5 7 A brief examination of the
applicable case law is therefore mandated to discover the reason for this denial and, further, to reveal the existence of a new trend by courts in allowing
a cause of action.

50. See Comment, A Cause of Action for "Wrongful Life" A Suggested Analysis, 55
MINN. L. REV. 58, 66 (1970) (values assigned depending on child's status); Comment,
"Wrongful Life": The Right Not to Be Born, 54 TUL. L. REV. 480, 497 (1980) (assigning
values to situation makes damages calculable); Comment, Genetic Counseling and Medical
Malpractice: Recognizing a Cause of Action for Wrongful Life, 8 T. MAR. L. REV. 154, 172
(1983) (once amounts fixed, compensatory damages awardable).
51. See Comment, A Cause of Action for "Wrongful Life" A Suggested Analysis, 55
MINN. L. REV. 58, 66 (1970).
52. See id. at 65 (in cases of minor or single defects, reasoning of Gleitman might be
correct in that impaired life preferable to nonexistence).
53. See id. at 65.
54. See Comment, "Wrongful Life": The Right Not to Be Born, 54 TUL. L. REV. 480,
497 (1980) (Restatement view basically balancing test); Comment, A Preference for Nonexistence: Wrongful Life and a Proposed Tort of Genetic Malpractice, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 477, 502
(1982) (balancing test requires weighing defects against benefits).
55. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920, at 509 (1979).
56. See Comment, "Wrongful Life": The Right Not to Be Born, 54 TUL. L. REV. 480,
498 (1980) (award amount measures difference between burdens and benefits; the more serious
impairment, the less beneficial life can be, thus higher recovery allowed); see also Comment,
Genetic Counseling and Medical Malpractice: Recognizing a Cause of Action for Wrongful
Life, 8 T. MAR. L. REV. 154, 174 (1983) (benefits rule also makes general pain and suffering
damages possible).
57. Cf Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537, 542-43 (D.S.C. 1981) (in suit by child,
even though all elements of cause of action met, court denies recovery on public policy
grounds).
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C. The Early Search for a Cause of Action
58
Historically, wrongful life has been applied in two different situations:
(1) in cases of illegitimacy where the child sues the person responsible for his
birth, seeking damages caused by the stigma of his condition; 59 and (2) in
cases where negligent genetic counseling occurs such that the parent is deprived of a significant choice in future family planning."
Under common law, a child could not recover for any injury received
before birth, since the child had no independent existence apart from its
mother.6 1 In 1946, however, a child was, for the first time, afforded a cause
of action stemming from medical negligence inflicted on the parent. 62 Seventeen years later, the term "wrongful life" was first mentioned in Zepeda v.
Zepeda,63 where the plaintiff-child sued his alleged father for seducing his
mother and wrongfully causing his birth." The child sought a remedy for
deprivation of the right to have a legal father and sought damages under the

58. But see Kashi, The Case of the Unwanted Blessing: Wrongful Life, 31 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1409, 1409-10 (1977) (three divisions of wrongful life cases). The first division, however,
deals with "wrongful conception" cases, which are essentially synonyms for wrongful pregnancy actions, rather than wrongful life, and will be treated as such. See id. at 1409.
59. See, e.g., Pinkney v. Pinkney, 198 So. 2d 52, 53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (daughter
sues father for stigma of illegitimacy), rev'd sub nomL Brown v. Bray, 300 So. 2d 668, 669 (Fla.
1977); Zepeda v. Zepeda, 190 N.E.2d 849, 851 (11. App. Ct. 1963) (child suing alleged father
for illegitimate birth); Williams v. State, 223 N.E.2d 343, 343, 269 N.Y.S.2d 786, 786 (1966)
(mother raped while inmate at state hospital; child brought suit alleging state's negligence
proximately caused her birth).
60. See, e.g., Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 956, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 339 (1982) (failure
to warn parents of potential hereditary deafness); Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 165
Cal. Rptr. 477, 479 (Ct. App. 1980) (physician negligently failed to diagnose Tay-Sachs disease); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 486 (Wash. 1983) (failure to warn mother
about possible harmful side effects to child by drug prescribed to control epilepsy); see also
Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1975) (negligent failure to diagnose rubella and
advise of attendant risks).
61. See Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northhampton, 138 Mass. 14, 17 (1884) (child has no
cause of action for prenatal injuries). This decision was followed for 62 years. See Magnolia
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 360, 78 S.W.2d 944, 950 (1935) (no duty
toward fetus who is only unseen, unknown, prospective human being).
62. See Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 141 (D.D.C. 1946) (if child born alive, can
bring action against person causing prenatal injuries); see also Rogers, Wrongful Life and
Wrongful Birth: Medical Malpractice in Genetic Counseling and Prenatal Testing, 33 S.C.L.
REV. 713, 731 (1982) (Bonbrest decision eventually adopted by every jurisdiction). But see
Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating to PrenatalInjuries, 110 U. PA.
L. REV. 554, 563 (1962) (worst injuries occur during previable stage of development, so viability requirement leaves much injury uncompensated). See generally Note, A Century of
Change: Liability for PrenatalInjuries, 22 WASHBURN L.J. 268, 268 (1983) (discussion of
historical background, current law, and theories of recovery for prenatal torts).
63. 190 N.E.2d 849 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963).
64. See id. at 858.
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theory of wrongful life. 65 The court, in denying relief, held that a decision
creating such a new tort would have a staggering social impact and, thus,
was a task better suited for the legislature.66
The first wrongful life case alleging negligent genetic counseling as a proximate cause of the birth of an imperfect child was the 1967 case of Gleitman
v. Cosgrove.67 After the plaintiff's mother had contracted rubella, the plaintiff was born severely deformed, despite the reassurances of her physicians
that the illness would have no adverse effect on the baby. 68 The court found
that, even though there was negligence, compensatory damages were impossible to award because there is no way to compare a life with defects with the
"utter void of nonexistence.", 69 This rationale has been used in virtually all
cases disallowing a wrongful life claim.7' The Gleitman court further held

65. See id. at 851. The child alleged deprivations of rights, including the right to be
legitimately born and to have a normal home. See id. at 851.
66. See id. at 852-53. The court analogized the cause of action to those decisions allowing
a child to recover for injuries received while in the mother's womb. See id. at 859.
67. See 227 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 1967). The first important departure from previous prenatal tort actions occurred in Gleitman, in that there was no claim that the physicians could
have decreased the possibility that the child would be born with defects. See id. at 692. Before
Gleitman, most tort actions were brought for prenatal injuries resulting in a child's deformity
that occurred because of the physician's negligence. See, e.g., Bergstreser v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d
22, 24 (8th Cir. 1978) (negligent caesarean section operation caused rupture of uterus in later
pregnancy, which led to birth defects); Larrabee v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 613, 614 (S.D.
Cal. 1966) (forceps caused injury to child's eye); Korman v. Hagen, 206 N.W. 650, 650 (Minn.
1925) (force used in delivery damaged nerves in child's arm causing partial paralysis). These
actions for prenatal injury are to be distinguished from wrongful life, where the child is not
alleging that anything could have been done about his condition, but rather that his parents
should have been allowed to make an informed decision. See Comment, Recognition of a New
Cause of Action for "Wrongful Life," 25 ST. Louis U.L.J. 455, 459 (1981) (no contention in
Gleitman that physician could have decreased likelihood of injury).
68. See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 690-91 (N.J. 1967). Despite common medical knowledge that severe birth defects were possible, the defendant-physician maintained that
there was no cause for alarm. See id. at 690-91.
69. See id. at 692. The court noted:
The normal measure of damages in tort actions is compensatory. Damages are measured
by comparing the condition plaintiff would have been in had the defendant not been negligent, with plaintiff's impaired condition as a result of the negligence .

. .

. This Court

cannot weigh the value of life with impairments against the nonexistence of life itself. By
asserting that he should not have been born, the infant plaintiff makes it logically impossible for a court to measure his alleged damages because of the impossibility of making the
comparison required by compensatory remedies.
Id. at 692; see also Malan, The Wrongful Life Controversy: Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories and Turpin v. Sortini, 18 IDAHo L. REV. 237, 242 (1982) (though defendant-physician
affirmatively mislead Gleitman, plaintiff had no cause of action because of inability to compare
existence with nonexistence).
70. See, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 12 (N.J. 1979) (no acceptable measure to
determine damages); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 901 (1978)
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that, even if damages cognizable at law were suffered, public policy considerations dealing with the importance of human life would deny the child's
claim." The dissent argued that the inability to precisely determine damages should not allow a negligent tortfeasor to escape liability for a foreseeable injury. 2 The dissent further found that the normal determination of
damages for pain and suffering required the same complex decision as would
wrongful life awards, thus concluding that the majority had erred in denying
the recovery sought."
D. Striving for Change: The Effects of Closer Scrutiny on Allowing a
Cause of Action
With the Roe v. Wade 4 decision legalizing abortion in 1973, there was
renewed hope that a cause of action for wrongful life might be recognized
since the public policy against abortion was no longer persuasive reasoning.75 Fruition came originally in two successful wrongful birth claims by
parents in 1975.76 This advancement led to a plethora of successful actions,
so that now the majority of courts have accepted the rationale of the wrongful birth claim.7 7 Despite this breakthrough, some courts remained aligned

(neither measurable damages nor cognizable injury exit); Stewart v. Long Island College
Hosp., 283 N.E.2d 616, 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640, 641 (1972) (no cognizable injury at law).
71. See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (N.J. 1967) (current societal standards
cannot tolerate decision that places nonexistence over that of even most impaired existence).
72. See id. at 703-704 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (citing Story Parchment Co. v. Peterson
Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931)) (if approximate damage figure possible, fundamental fairness dictates relief be given to avoid tortfeasor escaping liability); see also Comment, Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories and Turpin v. Sortini: The Rise and Fall of
Wrongful Life in California, 13 Sw. L.J. 369, 374 (1982) (Gleitman dissent found that allowing
negligent defendant to escape liability for foreseeable injury contrary to public policy and fundamental tort law).
73. See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 704 (N.J. 1967) (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
74. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
75. See Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 618, 635 (1979)
(public policy against abortion rationale for denying wrongful life no longer valid); see also
Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (N.J. 1979) (public policy now supports rather than disavows
right to abortion).
76. See Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 850 (Tex. 1975) (pecuniary losses occasioned
by wrongful birth allowed); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372, 377 (Wis. 1975)
(additional medical and hospital bills measure of recovery in wrongful birth suit).
77. See, e.g., Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471, 473 (7th Cir. 1981) (wrongful life
denied, but claim by parents under Federal Tort Claims Act allowed for failure of military
hospital to diagnose rubella in pregnant mother); Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 723
(Ala. 1982) (parents given damages in wrongful birth claim); Morris v. Frudenfeld, 185 Cal.
Rptr. 76, 85 (Ct. App. 1982) (failed sterilization, parents given damages); see also Comment,
Wrongful Life: A Legislative Solution to Negligent Genetic Counseling, 18 U.S.F.L. REV. 77,
97 (1983) (majority of courts denying wrongful life have upheld wrongful birth action).
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79
against wrongful life,78 so that it was not until 1977, in Park v. Chessin,
that a recovery for wrongful life was allowed.
In Park, parents who had already borne a child afflicted with polycystic
kidney disease were negligently informed by doctors that it was not a hereditary disease and that there was no danger of recurrence.8 " In a wrongful life
action brought by the second afflicted child, the lower court acknowledged
the Zepeda and Gleitman reasoning, but decided to keep pace with social,
economic, and technological change by allowing the child a cause of action." The court explored the effect of Roe, reasoning that once the ban on
abortion was lifted, constitutionally protected parental8 2choice required accu-

rate information in reference to the child's condition.

The Park decision was instrumental in the acceptance of the wrongful life

78. See Karlsons v. Guerinot, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933, 938 (App. Div. 1977). The court
showed its unwillingness to agree that plaintiff was in a worse position than if she had never
been born. See id. at 938. Further, the court dismissed the parents' claim that the new liberalization of abortion laws made older anti-wrongful life holdings obsolete, saying that birth itself
could not be considered an injury. See id. at 938; see also Stills v. Gratton, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652,
656 (Ct. App. 1976). In refusing to award wrongful life damages, the Stills court cited to the
impossibility of measuring damages. See id. at 656. Stills can be distinguished, however, because it deals mainly with a wrongful life claim for an illegitimate child rather than a deformed
one. See id. at 655. See generally Comment, Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories: Recognition of a New Cause of Action for "Wrongful Life", 25 ST. Louis U.L.J. 455, 460 (1981) (discussion of Karlsons v. Guerinot); Comment, Curlenderv. Bio-Science Laboratoriesand Turpin
v. Sortini: The Rise and Fall of Wrongful Life in California, 13 Sw. L.J. 369, 378 (1982) (short
discussion of Stills v. Gratton).
79. 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (App. Div. 1977).
80. See id. at 111. Polycystic kidney disease is an ailment marked by the presence of
numerous cysts which eventually engulf the kidneys. See Peters & Peters, Wrongful Life: Recognizing the Defective Child'sRight to a Cause of Action, 18 DUQ. L. REV. 857, 867 n.51 (1980)
(disease hereditary and uniformly fatal in childhood). The doctors had assured the plaintiffs
that chances of having another child with the affliction were "practically nil." See Park v.
Chessin, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110, 111 (App. Div. 1977), rev'd sub norn. Becker v. Schwartz, 386
N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978). The parents relied on this in deciding to have another
child. See id. at 111.
81. See Park v. Chessin, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110, 114 (App. Div. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Becker
v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978). The court said that because of the
public policy behind the abolition of the state abortion statute, the parents of a child known to
be potentially deformed have the right to seek an abortion. See id. at 114. This, the court
reasoned, led to "the fundamental right to be born as a whole, functioning human being." See
id. at 114. The court remarked that the acceptance of wrongful life as a viable cause of action
would impose no new duty on any physician, nor would it hold physicians liable to novel or
extraordinary consequences. See id. at 113. Rather, the cause of action would merely insure
physicians' attention to the extra dangers that wrongful genetic counseling might cause. See
id. at 113.
82. See id. at 114; see also Comment, Curlenderv. Bio-Science Laboratoriesand Turpin v.
Sortini: The Rise and Fall of Wrongful Life in California, 13 Sw. L.J. 369, 377 (1982) (knowledge of fetal problems invokes parental choice whether to have child).
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plea in another New York appellate court. 3 On appeal, however, the New
York Court of Appeals reasoned that implicit in determining injury is the
decision whether it is better never to be born than to be born with terrible
deficiencies. 4 This decision, the court observed, was a "mystery more properly to be left to the philosophers and theologians." 85 Thus, the court overruled both favorable wrongful life cases, concluding that there was neither a
cognizable injury at law,86 nor any logical way to determine damages.8 7 The
holding has been criticized on the grounds that the infant plaintiff exists and
suffers due to the negligence of the defendant, and that this is a proper question for the courts to decide.8 8 Furthermore, critics have theorized that denying the child's action, but allowing a cause of action for the mother, seems
an anomaly, as the duty owed to the mother should logically apply to the

83. See Becker v. Schwartz, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (App. Div. 1977), modified, 386 N.E.2d
807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978). In Becker, a woman in her late thirties was not warned by her
physicians of the significant danger of Down's Syndrome that accompanies late-life
pregnancies. See Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 808, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 896 (1978).
Her child was later born with the disease. See id. at 803, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 896. Park and
Becker were joined for appellate review by the New York Court of Appeals. See id. at 809, 413
N.Y.S.2d at 897.
84. See Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900 (1978).
85. See id. at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900. Judge Jasen remarked that the law and mankind
placed too high a value on human life for a court to resolve this type of issue. See id at 812,
413 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
86. See id. at 812, N.Y.S.2d at 900. The court felt there was no precedent at either common law or statutory law for the Park finding of a fundamental right to be born as a functioning, whole human being. See id. at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900. Furthermore, the Becker court
reaffirmed that if this action were recognized, it could lead to claims for "less-than-perfect"
births and the concurrent problem as to who would determine perfection. See id at 812, 413
N.Y.S.2d at 900. By this aspect of the decision, the Becker court was only reaffirming the fears
first announced in Zepeda about the flood of litigation that might follow from a recognition of
a cause of action for wrongful life. Cf Zepeda v. Zepeda, 190 N.E.2d 849, 858 (Ill. App. Ct.
1963).
87. See Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900 (1978). The
court held that in a negligence action, the main goal is to put the plaintiff in the position he
would have been in had there been no negligent act. See id. at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900. This
goal, the court felt, was impossible in a wrongful life action because all that could be restored
to the child is the nonexistence that would have occurred had his parents been warned. See id.
at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900. The court concluded that this was a "comparison the law is not
equipped to make." See id. at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900; see also Smith v. United States, 392 F.
Supp. 654, 656 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (logical impossibility in comparison of damages) (citing
Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 1967)); Elliot v. Brown, 361 So.2d 546, 548
(Ala. 1978) (determination impossible, no comparison available).
88. See Comment, Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratoriesand Turpin v. Sortini: The Rise
and Fall of Wrongful Life in California, 13 Sw. L.J. 369, 378 (1982). The author noted that
while a "court of law is not the appropriate place to conduct a philosophical battle... a court
of law is the proper place to compensate injuries directly attributable to the negligence of
others." Id. at 378.
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fetus as well. 9
In 1979, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Berman v. Allan,9 refused to
allow recovery for wrongful life, but in so doing tacitly modified part of its
holding in Gleitman.9' The court ruled that damages were no longer the
impenetrable question once imagined and that "it would be a perversion of
fundamental principles of justice to deny all relief" in a wrongful life case.92
Instead, the court denied a recovery for the child on public policy grounds,
holding that merely being born is not an actionable injury because of the
fundamental right to life supported by our Constitution and societal laws.93
The court held as a matter of law that the benefits of life, no matter how
impaired, always outweigh nonlife in the eyes of society and the law.94 This
89. See Comment, A Preferencefor Nonexistence: Wrongful Life and a Proposed Tort of
Genetic Malpractice, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 477, 495 (1982) (since counseled patients are both
parents and unborn children, responsibility also extends to prospective child).
90. 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979). Mrs. Berman was 38 years old at the time of her pregnancy,
which markedly increased her chances of giving birth to a child with Down's Syndrome. See
id. at 10. During her months of care, the defendant-physicians never suggested amniocentesis,
which could have uncovered the defect. See id. at 10. The Bermans sued for wrongful life on
behalf of their daughter and sought recovery for emotional and medical damages to themselves
as a result of the doctor's negligence. See id. at 10.
91. Cf id. at 11-12. The court affirmed its earlier determination that the basis of tort law
was compensatory and that this made it necessary to compare existence with nonexistence.
See id. at 11-12. Calling such an endeavor impossible, the court quoted Chief Justice Weintraub in his separate opinion in Gleitman, saying man "'who knows nothing of death or nothingness'" cannot make legal judgments on things he can know nothing about. See id. at 12
(citing Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 711 (N.J. 1967) (Weintraub, J., concurring &
dissenting)). The Berman court repudiated its earlier decision and held that the public policy
against abortion could no longer be deemed controlling over the rights of parents to make a
choice. See id. at 14.
92. See Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 12 (N.J. 1979). The court reasoned that the complex process that would be needed to determine damages in a wrongful life case should not be
used as the sole reason for denying recovery. See id. at 12. The court noted its reluctance "to
deny the validity of. . . [the] complaint solely because damages are difficult to ascertain,"
since this would be against the weight of authority in all jurisdictions. See id. at 12. If the
measure of damages was the only problem, the court admitted, a remedy of some sort could be
given to the plaintiff to compensate for the injuries suffered. See id. at 12; see also Comment,
Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life: Questions of Public Policy, 28 Loy. L. REv. 77, 85 n.63
(1982) (court briefly noted damages could be found, but failed to specify how computations
might be made).
93. See Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 13 (N.J. 1979). The court explained its reasoning
by pointing out the commitment to the sanctity of human life as illustrated by the due process
clause of the fifth amendment, the Declaration of Independence, and the procedural safeguards
given to those facing the death penalty. See id. at 13; see also Comment, Genetic Counseling
and Medical Malpractice: Recognizing a Cause of Action for Wrongful Life, 8 T. MAR. L.
REV. 154, 163 (1982) (Berman court bound to uphold societal-placed value on human life).
94. See Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 13 (N.J. 1979). Even with knowledge that the
child's life would be extremely limited due to both physical and mental pain, the court held
that no recovery could be fashioned. See id. at 13. The pleasure and happiness she would
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argument has been declared specious by commentators and courts primarily
because it treats all genetic problems equally, while some afflictions make
nonexistence preferable in comparison.9 5 The "benefits of life" argument,
96
however, was used by later courts to deny subsequent wrongful life claims,
until the first wrongful life recoveries were upheld in the 1980's.
E.

The New Trend in Wrongful Life

In Curlenderv. Bio-Science Laboratories,97 a court's wrongful life award
withstood appellate review for the first time. Due to alleged negligent genetic counseling by physicians, an infant was born with Tay-Sachs disease98
and thereafter brought suit seeking pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. 99
The court, in allowing a wrongful life claim, rejected the theory of other
courts that metaphysical decisions had to be reached.'co Further, it summaexperience merely by being alive, the court concluded, more than made her life worth living for

her. See id. at 13.
95. See, e.g., Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 962, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 345 (1982) (under
some circumstances nonexistence may be preferable to life); Kelley, Wrongful Life, Wrongful
Birth, and Justice in Tort Law, WASH. U.L.Q. 919, 937 (1979) (denying recovery in wrongful
life suit based on unsupportable contention that sorrows of life always outweighed by joys);
Note, A Cause ofAction For "Wrongful Life'" A Suggested Analysis, 55 MINN. L. REv. 58, 6566 (1970) (severity of some deformities make it unclear whether life with these defects preferred over nonexistence).
96. See Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537, 543 (D.S.C. 1980) (in suit by child,

policy considerations other than theory that life is more precious than nonlife are merely cumulative); see also Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 964, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 347 (1982) (refusal
to allow general damages on "sanctity of life" argument, although wrongful life recognized).
97. 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Ct. App. 1980).
98. See id. at 480. Tay-Sachs is a fatal, progressive disease of the nervous system that
primarily affects Eastern Europeans of Jewish extraction and their children. See id. at 480 n.4.
A simple test was developed that reveals possible carriers of the disease and would have allowed the parents to arrive at an informed decision on whether to continue the pregnancy. See
id. at 480 n.4 (citing Howard v. Lecher, 366 N.E.2d 64, 67, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363, 366 (1977)
(Cooke, J., dissenting) (further discussion of Tay-Sachs disease)).
99. See Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 490 (Ct. App. 1980).
The child alleged that because of the disease, she suffered from mental retardation, convulsions, loss of motor reactions, muscular atrophy, gross physical deformity, as well as other
disabilities. See id. at 480-81; see 'also Comment, Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratoriesand
Turpin v. Sortini: The Rise and Fallof Wrongful Life in California, 13 Sw. L.J. 369, 372 n. 14
(1982) (other disabilities alleged included susceptibility to other diseases, pseudobulper palsy,
and inability to feed by mouth). The plaintiff sought damages for medical costs, emotional
distress, the deprivation of "72.6 years of her life," a number based on actuarial tables for a
normal lifespan, and punitive damages of $3 million, for the "reckless disregard" or "knowing" character of the tort. See Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 481
(Ct. App. 1980).
100. See Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 486-87 (Ct. App.
1980). "[T]here is not [sic] universal acceptance of the notion that 'metaphysics' or 'religious
beliefs,' rather than law, should govern the situation." Id. at 486. This is especially true today
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rily dismissed any public policy argument, reasoning that public policy
should be concerned with compensating injuries, not with dismissing
claims. 10 The court ruled that the only necessary determination is based on
the basic principles of tort law, those being duty, breach, causation, and
damages. l 2
The doctor's duty was viewed as a responsibility to use ordinary care in
providing genetic counseling to the mother.103 The court in Curlenderhad
no difficulty in declaring that this duty had been breached by the physician. " The problem, the court remarked, was in the determination of the
"proximate cause of an injury cognizable at law."' 0 5 The proximate cause
was found in that "[t]he reality of the 'wrongful life' concept is that such a
plaintiff both exists and suffers, due to the negligence of others." ' 6 While
emotionally appealing, this determination has been criticized for its avoidance of the problems of comparing nonexistence and existence, a comparison
other courts have seen as crucial.'17 The Curlendercourt viewed damages

when technological breakthroughs have provided the ways and means of avoiding "genetic
disaster." See id. at 487. The reasoning of the Curlendercourt is not revolutionary, as the
echos of its analysis can be seen in dissenting opinions of previous wrongful life cases. See
Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 21 (N.J. 1979) (Handler, J., concurring & dissenting). Justice
Handler noted that the injury of the child "might be hard to sense, difficult to define and
puzzling to evaluate," but it constitutes a valid tort claim and should be remedied. See id. at
21.
101. See Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 486 (Ct. App. 1980).
The court remarked that public policy should include social welfare considerations as affected
by competent genetic counseling. See id. at 486-87.
102. See id. at 487. Other jurisdictional law also supports these elements as necessary for
a cause of action in negligence. See, e.g., Knight v. United States, 498 F. Supp. 316, 323 (E.D.
Mich. 1980) (elements of negligence are duty, breach, causation, and damages); Lawyer's Sur.
v. Snell, 617 S.W.2d 750, 752 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ) (Texas law
requires that legal duty, breach of that duty, and proximately caused injuries occur); Rodriguez v. Carson, 519 S.W.2d 214, 216 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, writ refd n.r.e.) (plaintiff must prove legal duty, breach, and damages proximately caused in order to recover).
103. See Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 488 (Ct. App. 1980);
see also Comment, Curlenderv. Bio-Science Laboratoriesand Turpin v. Sortini: The Rise and
Fall of Wrongful Life in California, 13 Sw. L.J. 369, 381 (1982) (duty owed by genetic counselor to give accurate information based wholly on accurate genetic tests).
104. See Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 488 (Ct. App. 1980).
105. See id. at 488.
106. See id. at 488 (emphasis in original); see also Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ.
Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692, 695 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (causation present if parents state they would
have obtained abortion had true situation been disclosed); Comment, Wrongful Life: The
Right Not to Be Born, 54 TUL. L. REV. 480, 491 (1980) (causation satisfied if parent shows lack
of information and corresponding failure to obtain abortion).
107. See Comment, The Trend Toward Judicial Recognition of Wrongful Life: A Dissenting View, 31 UCLA L. REv. 473, 492 (1983). In failing to answer the existence-nonexistence
questions, the commentator noted, the court weakened its opinion because it never dealt with
the problems raised in Gleitman and its progeny. See id. at 492-93; see also Comment, Wrong-
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as the amount that would compensate the infant for the injuries proximately
caused by the negligence; namely, a general recovery for pain and suffering,
special awards for medical expenses, and finally, the possibility of punitive
damages. 108
The court noted emphatically that it was not recognizing damages or a
cause of action for the right not to be born, but was answering the question
10 9
posed solely on the normal recovery of damage for pain and suffering.
The court, however, offered no reasoning for its conclusions regarding damages, thus leaving its motivational factors an enigma. "o The decision is important because it placed the cause of action for wrongful life within the
traditional tort framework and allowed recovery without ever having to deal
with the metaphysical question which stymied earlier courts."'
The Curlenderdecision created a storm of opposition so strong in California that two major attempts to nullify its effects were mounted. The first was
an unsuccessful attempt by the California Legislature to pass an "antiwrongful life" bill to limit such decisions." 2 The second was the case of
ful Life: A Legislative Solution to Negligent Genetic Counseling, 18 U.S.F.L. REV. 77, 85
(1983) (courts have avoided Curlender reasoning because of failure to deal with nexus question
of comparing existence and nonexistence).
108. See Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 489 (Ct. App. 1980).
The court based the decision on fundamental elements of jurisprudence which provide that
"for every wrong there is a remedy." See id. at 489. This reasoning has been criticized for its
failure to determine whether birth can be the proximate cause of a legally cognizable injury
and for its avoidance of deciding whether birth is a detriment which calls for a remedy. See
Comment, Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories: Recognition of a New Cause of Action for
"Wrongful Life" 25 ST. Louis U.L.J. 455, 467 (1981). The Curlendercourt determined that
there was no legal or public policy reasons to exempt a physician from liability for punitive
damages in a wrongful life case where the necessary facts are proven. See Curlender v. BioScience Laboratories, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 490 (Ct. App. 1980).
109. See Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 490 (Ct. App. 1980).
One author has noted that by this "pain and suffering only" mode of recovery, the California
court has removed the core element that had been asserted in the past, i.e., that the recovery
sought was for the "right not to be born." See Comment, Curlenderv. Bio-Science Laboratories and Turpin v. Sortini: The Rise and Fall of Wrongful Life in California, 13 Sw. L.J. 369,
384 (1982).
110. See Comment, Curlenderv. Bio-Science Laboratoriesand Turpin v. Sortini: The Rise
and Fall of Wrongful Life in California, 13 Sw. L.J. 369, 384 (1982) (suggesting two possible
motivations for Curlendercourt's ruling). The author stated that it was likely that the court
was trying to avoid any problems of appellate review by confining the "parameters of wrongful
life." See id. at 384. The author further hypothesized that the court was trying to solve the
wrongful life question solely on firm legal grounds, rather than relying on theological or philosophical arguments. See id. at 384.
111. See id. at 386 (Curlender revamped cause of action to fit within traditional legal
principles; wrongful life became "hybrid" negligence or malpractice action).
112. See id. at 387. The bill as originally drafted would have totally abolished any future
cause of action for wrongful life. See id. at 388. The bill was rejected, however, and was
redrafted and passed in a form that only banned infants from bringing wrongful life suits
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Turpin v. Sortini,113 decided by the California Supreme Court almost two
years later.
In Turpin, a girl born with congenital deafness was not allowed recovery
for general pain and suffering damages for being denied the right to be born
as a "whole human being," but was awarded special damages for extraordinary teaching and equipment expenses." 4 Unlike Curlender, the court
found the problem was not whether a legally cognizable injury occurred, but
rather if any damages could be fashioned by the court."' In an unprecedented opinion, the court determined that in some cases nonexistence might
be preferable to an impaired existence.'1 6 The court was concerned, however, with the difficulty that a wrongful life action would present to the average jury.' 1 7 First, the court feared that the average juror was not qualified to
compare existence and nonexistence, as required by the law of compensatory
damages.' 1 8 Second, in valuating the injury, the jury would have no "frame

against their parents. See id. at 388. This could be considered as a tacit approval by the
California Legislature of the normal cause of action against the physician, even though Turpin
refused to consider it as such. See id. at 389.
113. 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
114. See id. at 956, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 339. In Turpin, the parents of a small child, suspecting a hearing deficiency, took her to a hearing specialist for a diagnosis. See id. at 956, 182
Cal. Rptr. at 339. The defendant-doctor pronounced her hearing to be normal even though
she was really totally deaf as the result of a hereditary disease. See id. at 956, 182 Cal. Rptr. at
339. In reliance on this diagnosis, and before discovering her true condition, the Turpins
conceived another girl who was born with the same disease. See id. at 956, 182 Cal. Rptr. at
339. The second child alleged negligence in failure to diagnose the deafness in her older sister,
and that it was this negligence that caused her injury. See id. at 956, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
115. See id. at 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346. The Supreme Court of California addressed the
issue as the Curlendercourt did, by considering the action as a standard tort or malpractice
case. See id. at 959, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 342. The court remarked that the defendants had not
disputed that they had breached a duty to the plaintiff's sister, and since the risks of injury to
later children were reasonably foreseeable, this duty, breach, and proximate causation existed
as to the plaintiff also. See id. at 960, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
116. See id. at 962, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 345. While endorsing prior courts' efforts to uphold
the sanctity and importance of impaired life, the Turpin court questioned how awarding damages to a handicapped child in any way disfavored the sanctity of life. See id. at 961-62, 182
Cal. Rptr. 344-45. The court concluded by saying:
In this case, in which the plaintiff's only affliction is deafness, it seems quite unlikely that a
jury would ever conclude that life with such a condition is worse than not being born at
all. Other wrongful life cases, however, have involved children with much more serious,
debilitating and painful conditions. . . . Considering the short life span of many of these
children and their frequently very limited ability to perceive or enjoy the benefits of life,
we cannot assert with confidence that in every situation there would be a societal consenus that life is preferable to never having been born at all.
Id. at 962-63, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 345-46.
117. See id. at 963-64, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346-47.
118. See id. at 963-64, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346-47. The court felt there was a great difference between assessing damages in a personal injury or wrongful death case and trying to do
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of reference in their own general experience to appreciate what the plaintiff
has lost-normal life without pain and suffering." 1 1 9 Thus, the court concluded that general damages for pain and suffering were not recoverable in a
wrongful life action. 20 The court then recognized, however, that the special
damages claimed by the child would be recoverable even in the absence of
" ' Thus, California became the first state to recognize
general damages. 12
wrongful life, both as a cause of action and as a valid way to recover
damages.
Two other state courts have followed the Turpin rationale in allowing a
limited wrongful life recovery. First, in Harbesonv. Parke-Davis,Inc., 122 the

the same in a wrongful life action. See id. at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346. The problem occurs
not in determining damages for an admitted injury, but in actually determining whether an
injury has occurred at all, a decision the average juror is not experienced to make since he has
no knowledge of nonexistence. See id. at 963-64, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346-47; see also Speck v.
Finegold, 408 A.2d 496, 512 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979), rev'd in part, 439 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1981)
(Spaeth, J., concurring & dissenting) (monetary value of health over impaired existence within
experience of average juror; value of nonexistence not). But see Note, The Judicial System's
Wrongful Conception of "Wrongful Life", 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 493, 504 (1983) (not a
valid reason to deny recovery since juries in most tort cases cannot imagine quality of plaintiff's life before and after injury) (citing Bryan v. Ross, 114 S.E.2d 97, 99 (S.C. 1960)); cf
Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 618, 649 (1979) (existence
and nonexistence necessary comparison in wrongful death actions; wrongful life should not be
denied on this ground).
119. See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 964, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 347 (1982). The court
reasoned that while fixing general damages for pain and suffering in a personal injury case is
difficult, at least the average juror will have an idea of what was lost by the wrong inflicted.
See id. at 964, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 347. The court felt that this was not the case in a wrongful life
action because "what the plaintiff has 'lost' is not life without pain and suffering but rather the
unknowable status of never having been born." See id. at 964, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
120. See id. at 964, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 347. The court held that general pain and suffering
damages in this particular case were too difficult to measure and that they would not "in any
meaningful sense compensate the plaintiff for the loss of the opportunity not to be born." See
id. at 964, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
121. See id. at 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348. The court thought it illogical to only allow the
parents to recover for the cost of any special medical or educational expenses caused by the
negligence. See id. at 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348. Holding that these damages were measurable
and certain, the court limited damages only to the extent of not allowing a double recovery
should the parents bring a wrongful birth suit. See id. at 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348; see also
Comment, Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratoriesand Turpin v. Sortini: The Rise and Fall of
Wrongful Life in California, 13 Sw. L.J. 369, 393 (1982) (Curlender was important decision
for wrongful life supporters, but Turpin changed wrongful life into secondary source of recovery in wrongful birth suit).
122. 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983). Mrs. Harbeson had been diagnosed as having epilepsy
and had been prescribed an anti-convulsant drug by the defendant-physician. See id. at 486.
She and her husband asked three doctors on different occasions whether the drug would have
an effect on any future children. See id. at 486. All three doctors responded that there could
be some minor correctable effects, such as temporary hirsuitism or cleft palate, but that no
major problems would occur. See id. at 486. The Harbesons' next two children were affected
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Washington Supreme Court cited Turpin to show inconsistency in granting
damages to the parents alone for costs of medical care stemming from the
handicapped nature of the child.123 Reaffirming that wrongful life did not
abandon the sanctity of human life, and that general pain and suffering damages were not available,124 the court followed Turpin and allowed recovery
of medical costs by the child. 2 5 Second, in Procanik v. C1, 2' 6 the New
Jersey Supreme Court vitiated its earlier landmark holdings and allowed recovery for the child's special medical expenses.' 27 The court found it illogical to allow the parents a reimbursement of special damages for wrongful
birth while disallowing the same recovery for the child, 121 particularly when
the parents' claim was barred by the statute of limitations.' 29 The court
refused to allow damages for pain and suffering, holding that the theoretical
with a variety of mental and physical abnormalities that would have been revealed had a
proper inquiry been made by the doctors. See id. at 486. But see Note, Washington Recognizes
Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life-A CriticalAnalysis, 58 WASH. L. REV. 649, 652 n.26
(1983) (discussion of whether even if proper search had been made, literature discussing potential problem could have been found).
123. See Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 495 (Wash. 1983). The court
agreed with the Turpin opinion by remarking that medical costs do not disappear upon attaining majority and by expressing fear that this burden will thereafter fall either on the parents or
possibly the state. See id. at 495. The Harbeson court determined that it was better to place
these costs on the person whose negligent act proximately caused the situation. See id. at 495.
124. See id. at 496 (court agreed with long line of cases, including Turpin, holding that
existence cannot be compared with nonexistence to determine general damages).
125. See id. at 496. The court concluded that foreseeable extraordinary medical and
training expenses resulting as a consequence of a defective child are easily and readily calculable and, as such, recoverable. See id. at 496. But see Note, Washington Recognizes Wrongful
Birth and Wrongful Life-A CriticalAnalysis, 58 WASH. L. REV. 649, 668 (1983) (decision
failed to adequately confront issue of whether birth is an "injury" cognizable at law).
126. 478 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984). Much as in Gleitman, Procanik involved the negligent
failure to diagnose rubella in a pregnant woman, resulting in a baby born with serious birth
defects. See id. at 757.
127. See id. at 764. The court noted the slow evolution in the law from a denial of both
parents' and child's causes of action, to an acceptance of the parents' suit, to a limited recognition of the child's ability to sue. See id. at 758-60.
128. See id. at 762. The court noted that only injustice could result from making the
parents' recovery exclusive. See id. at 762. Further, the court remarked that "law is more
than an exercise in logic, and logical analysis, although essential to a system of ordered justice,
should not become an instrument of injustice." Id. at 762.
129.
See id. at 762. Justice Pollock ruled that:
Here, the parent's claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Does this mean that Peter
must forego medical treatment for his blindness, deafness, and retardation? We think not.
His claim for the medical expenses attributable to his birth defects is reasonably certain,
readily calculable, and of a kind daily determined by judges and juries.
Id. at 762. The court based much of its reasoning, in allowing the child to recover damages, on
the tremendous effect medical disabilities can have on an interdependent family unit. The
recovery of compensatory damages from the negligent physician was seen by the court to be a
necessary conclusion of an act that so affects the family unit as a whole. The court felt that
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justice of allowing these damages is predominated
by the "essentially irra' 130
claim."
that
of
nature
unpredictable
and
tional
III.

PRENATAL TORTS IN TEXAS

A. Actions for Wrongful Pregnancy and Wrongful Birth
Texas courts have encountered numerous actions alleging some type of
prenatal negligence on the part of a physician.1 3 1 The confusion in denominating suits as wrongful pregnancy, wrongful birth, or wrongful life has not
been as dramatic in Texas as in other jurisdictions, but is nevertheless
present.132
Early in the national evolution of wrongful pregnancy suits, a Texas court
ruled that public policy precluded awarding any damages to the parents of134a
133
Texas has steadfastly clung to that decision,
healthy child for his birth.
despite contrary holdings in other jurisdictions.1 3' The most recent Texas
case on point denied any recovery by the parents for the birth of a child after

brothers and sisters of the injured child must be considered, so that medical costs will not
drain away funds for their food, clothes, or college education. See id. at 762.
130. See id. at 763. The ultimate problem was once again seen by the court to be the lack
of a natural way to compare the pain and suffering of impaired existence with nonexistence, or
to measure nonexistence at all. See id. at 763.
131. See, e.g., Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 920 (Tex. 1984) (wrongful life action
brought by child); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 845, 847 (Tex. 1975) (parents brought
wrongful birth action); Hickman v. Myers, 632 S.W.2d 869, 870 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1982, no writ) (wrongful pregnancy action brought by parents).
132. Cf Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex. 1975) (court referred to wrongful
life and wrongful birth as part of same action).
133. See Hays v. Hall, 477 S.W.2d 402, 406 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1972), rev'd on
other grounds, 488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1973). The case involved a child who was born after a
negligently performed vasectomy. See id. at 403. In refusing to overturn the trial court's
dismissal, the court of appeals noted that a doctor should not have to pay for satisfaction and
affection which parents receive from a healthy child. See id.at 406.
134. See Hickman v. Myers, 632 S.W.2d 869, 870 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no
writ) (parents cannot be damaged by birth of normal child); Sutkin v. Beck, 629 S.W.2d 131,
131-32 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (intangible benefits to plaintiffs outweigh
economic loss; no recovery); Silva v. Howe, 608 S.W.2d 840, 842 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (statute of limitations ran on claim; no recovery even if had not);
Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 127-28 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (even if no public policy argument, benefits still outweigh loss), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
927 (1974).
135. See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 476-77 (Ct. App. 1967) (plaintiff
entitled to total costs of raising unplanned child so that family resources not depleted); Troppi
v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511, 518-19 (Mich. 1971) (court allows recovery under "benefits rule,"
which balances benefits and costs of having a child); Kingsbury v. Smith, 442 A.2d 1003, 1006
(N.H. 1982) (traditional tort damages of medical expenses, pain and suffering, and wife's lost
earnings).
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a negligently attempted sterilization." 6 The court held as a matter of law
that public policy in Texas recognizes that the benefits of having a 13healthy
7
child outweigh any economic loss incurred in rearing such a child.
In contrast to the decisions involving wrongful pregnancy, the Texas
Supreme Court, in Jacobs v. Theimer,138 became the first court in the United
States to allow a recovery for wrongful birth. 139 In granting recovery for all
pecuniary expenses necessary for care of a child, the court held that there
were no public policy arguments that should keep parents from being compensated.""4 The court qualified its decision by holding that relief of the
economic burden placed on the family had none of the speculative qualities
which would accompany pain and suffering damages.' 4 1 The wrongful birth

136. See Hickman v. Myers, 632 S.W.2d 869, 872 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no
writ). The Hickmans were already the parents of two children and opted for sterilization as a
means of birth control. See id. at 870. The operation on Mrs. Hickman was unsuccessful
because the defendant-surgeon failed to completely seal off the right fallopian tube, allowing
pregnancy to occur. See id. at 870.
137. See id. at 872 (no injury in birth of healthy child as intangible benefits of parenthood
outweigh monetary burdens). The Texas public policy has been derived from many sources.
See, e.g., Wilczynski v. Goodman, 391 N.E.2d 479, 487 (Ill. 1979) (normal healthy life not
compensable wrong, but esteemed right); Christensen v. Thomby, 255 N.W. 620, 622 (Minn.
1934) (father blessed with another child has not suffered any injury); Ball v. Mudge, 391 P.2d
201, 204 (Wash. 1964) (costs associated with pregnancy and birth far outweighed by gift of
healthy child). But cf Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511, 517 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (state law
funding contraceptives shows public policy no longer supports denial of wrongful pregnancy
damages); Note, Confusion of Actions in Wrongful Life, Wrongful Birth, and Wrongful Pregnancy, 35 ALA. L. REV. 179, 185 (1984) (difficult to call birth blessing when parents have tried
to avoid it). One court recently held that rights of contraception and family planning are being
impaired by failure to recognize a wrongful pregnancy action. See Ochs v. Borrelli, 445 A.2d
883, 885 (Conn. 1982); see also Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (Cadena, J., dissenting) (regardless of any moral argument,
parents have right to prevent conception and even abort child; any frustration of this right
should be actionable), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974).
138. 519 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. 1975). Mrs. Jacobs contracted rubella early in her pregnancy
and later gave birth to a child with "rubella syndrome" birth defects. See id. at 847. She
alleged that Dr. Theimer was negligent in his failure to diagnose the rubella and asked for
special damages consisting of medical expenses and general damages for mental pain and suffering. See id. at 847. The trial court entered summary judgment for the defendant, but the
supreme court reversed. See id. at 850.
139. Cf id. at 849-50; see Comment, The Risk of Birth Defects: Jacobs v. Theimer and
Parents'Right to Know, 2 AM. J.L. & MED. 213, 216 (1976-1977) (Jacobsfirst case to allow
cause of action on claim of negligent genetic counseling).
140. See Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex. 1975). The court found that Dr.
Theimer had a duty to make a disclosure of any risks discovered by his testing. See id. at 848.
The court admitted that damages were the true difficulty in the case, but held that public
policy could not justify depriving parents of information necessary for an informed decision
and at the same time insulate the wrongdoer from liability. See id. at 848.
141. See id. at 849. But see Comment, The Risk of Birth Defects: Jacobs v. Theimer and
Parents' Right to Know, 2 AM. J.L. & MED. 213, 238 (1976-1977) (Jacobs court should have
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holding was affirmed in Nelson v. Krusen, 4' 2 decided in October 1984, but
the Texas Supreme Court simultaneously denied recovery for the attendant
wrongful life suit in a case of first impression in Texas. 43
B. Actions for Wrongful Life: Nelson v. Krusen
Tom and Gloria Nelson were the parents of a child who was afflicted with
Duchenne muscular dystrophy,'" when, in 1976, Mrs. Nelson became pregnant again and numerous tests were performed to determine whether an
abortion should be considered.145 Relying on Dr. Krusen's report, the Nelsons assumed everything was normal until long after the birth of their son,
Mark. 146 While still an infant, yet after the medical malpractice statute of
limitations had passed, Mark was diagnosed as having Duchenne muscular
dystrophy. 4' 7 The Nelsons brought a wrongful birth suit for themselves and
a wrongful life suit for Mark, but the district court found that both actions
were barred by limitations and granted summary judgment for the defendants. 48 The Dallas court of appeals upheld the statute of limitations bar
against the 4parents
and decided that Mark's claim was not tenable under
9
Texas law. 1

awarded pain and suffering damages as they are no more difficult to comprehend than in personal injury cases).
142. 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984).
143. See id. at 925. Jacobs dealt with an action arising from negligent genetic counseling,
but only the parents brought suit and no wrongful life suit was brought on the child's behalf.
See Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1975). Thus, Nelson provided the Texas
court with the first chance to act on the wrongful life claim. See Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d
918, 924-25 (Tex. 1984).
144. See Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 920 (Tex. 1984).
145. See id. at 920. Mrs. Nelson specifically consulted with Dr. Krusen to determine if
she was a genetic carrier of Duchenne muscular dystrophy. See id. at 920.
146. See id. at 920. The Nelsons alleged that the choice not to terminate the pregnancy
was due to the assertions by the defendant that Mrs. Nelson was not a genetic carrier of the
disease. See id. at 920.
147. See id. at 920. Mark Nelson was born on November 24, 1976, but it was not until
November 12, 1979, that a nursery school examination revealed that he had "tight heel cords
bilaterally" which were a symptom of his disease. See id. at 920.
148. See id. at 919.
149. See Nelson v. Krusen, 635 S.W.2d 582, 584-85 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982), rev'd in
part, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984). The court of appeals felt the "discovery" rule, which prevents the running of the statute of limitations until the injury is or should be discovered, was
not applicable to the Nelson's malpractice claim since prenatal malpractice did not fall into the
three exclusive categories provided by the Texas Supreme Court in Robinson v. Weaver, 550
S.W.2d 18, 19-20 (Tex. 1977) (foreign objects, negligent vasectomy, excessive x-ray exposure).
See id. at 584. The court of appeals ruled that Mark's claim could not be supported by Texas
law and refused to allow his claim until endorsed by the Texas Supreme Court. See id. at 585-
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The supreme court, on a motion for rehearing,15 ° affirmed in part and
reversed in part the determination of the court of appeals.15 1 Speaking for
the majority, Justice Spears ruled that the two year statute of limitations
under article 5.82, section 4, of the Texas Insurance Code, 52 as applied to
bar the parents' suit, was unconstitutional as violating the "open courts"
provision of the Texas Constitution.153 In implementing the "discovery
rule" to wrongful birth actions,' 5 4 the court held that the Nelsons had to sue

150. See Nelson v. Krusen, 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 82, 84-86 (Nov. 19, 1983) (withdrawn
opinion denied both wrongful life and wrongful birth claims), withdrawn, 678 S.W.2d 918
(Tex. 1984).
151. See Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 925 (Tex. 1984).
152. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.82, § 4 (Vernon 1981), repealed by Medical Liability
and Insurance Improvement Act, ch. 817, § 41.03, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 2039, 2064. For
essentially the same provisions, see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon
Supp. 1985). The statute, in part, provides:
Notwithstanding any other law, no health care liability claim may be commenced unless
the action is filed within two years from the occurrence of the breach or tort or from the
date the medical or health care treatment that is the 'subject of the claim . . . is
completed.
Id.
153. See Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 923 (Tex. 1984); TEx. CONST. art. I, § 13
(1876, amended 1984). "All courts shall be open, and every person for any injury done him in
his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law." Id. The
Nelson court reasoned that Texas case law was in conformity with the principle that the legislature cannot "make a remedy by due course of law contingent on an impossible condition."
See Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tex. 1984); see also Sax v. Vottler, 648 S.W.2d
661, 665-66 (Tex. 1983) (right to enter Texas courts only abrogated by legislature when legislative basis for statute outweighs denial of constitutional right); McCrary v. City of Odessa, 482
S.W.2d 151, 153 (Tex. 1972) (children and those incompetent to comply with notice requirement excused from performance). The Nelson court concluded that the statute barring the
Nelsons' claim would require suit to be brought before there could be any reason to believe
that they should sue. See Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 923 (Tex. 1984). In holding the
statute unconstitutional, the court noted that it could not defer to such an unreasonable condition, as it would be a blatant abdication of the judicial duty to secure rights granted by the
Texas Constitution. See id. at 923.
154. See id. at 923; Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577, 580 (Tex. 1967) (statute of limitations does not run until injury is or should be discovered). The discovery rule has also been
applied to negligent vasectomy cases. See Christ v. Lipsitz, 160 Cal. Rptr. 498, 501 (Ct. App.
1979) (statute of limitations begins to run only when reasonable person would be put on inquiry); Hays v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Tex. 1973) (in failed vasectomy cases, statute of
limitations begins when plaintiff discovers operation's failure). Not all jurisdictions, however,
have adopted the discovery rule. See Clark v. Randall, 272 S.E. 2d 769, 770 (Ga. 1980) (statute of limitations for improper sterilization two years); McKnight v. New York City Health &
Hosp. Corp., 416 N.Y.S.2d 63, 64 (App. Div. 1979) (statute of limitation begins running day of
operation). See generally Note, Medical Malpractice: "Discovery Rule" Rejected in Wrongful
Birth or Wrongful Life Actions A risingfrom Negligent Sterilization Operations,6 AM. J. TRIAL
AD. 511, 511-12 (1983) (case law approving or disapproving of application of discovery rule in
medical malpractice cases).
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on their own behalf within two years of the discovery of the negligent act.155
Since the Nelsons had met this criterion, the court reversed the wrongful
15 6
birth portion of the judgment.
Turning its attenion to the issue of Mark's wrongful life claim, the court
found that prior case law had provided two reasons for denying wrongful life
claims.157 The first consideration that the court noted was the public policy
supporting the sanctity of human life."15 The second factor was the impossibility of determining damages due to the necessity of comparing life and
nonlife.15 9 The court discussed and attempted to distinguish Turpin, Harbeson, and Procanik, concluding that the impossibility of determining if injury
had indeed occurred necessarily barred any wrongful life claim." 6
Both the wrongful birth and the wrongful life aspects of this holding were
in dispute by the members of the court, as evidenced by the separate opinions filed by Justices Robertson, 6 1 Kilgarlin, 162 Gonzales, 163 and Wal-

155. See Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 924 (Tex. 1984). The statute of limitations
in Nelson could only begin to run when the parents knew or should have known of Mark's
disability. See id.at 923. The earliest this could have been was in February 1980, so the
statute of limitations began to run then, rather than at Mark's birth. Cf id.at 920.
156. See id. at 925.
157. See id. at 924.
158. See id.at 924. The court cited Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E. 2d 807, 812, 413
N.Y.S.2d 895, 902 (1978), saying that there is an unwillingness to allow a plaintiff damages
merely for being alive, this being due to the high value that society has placed on human life.
See Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 924 (Tex. 1984).
159. See Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 924 (Tex. 1984). The court felt that the
"benefit rule" would preclude any chance of recovery. See id. at 924. The benefit rule provides that when a tortfeasor's act causes harm to a plaintiff, but at the same time confers a
benefit to him, the value of this benefit mitigates the damage award. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920, at 509 (1979). This rule was believed by the court to require the comparison between life and nonlife that had often been condemned. See Nelson v. Krusen, 678
S.W.2d 918, 924 (Tex. 1984).
160. See Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 925 (Tex. 1984). The court insisted that the
holding was not based on a "mere difficulty in assessing a dollar amount of damages," since
damages need not be precise in order to recover. See id.at 925.
161. See id.at 925 (Robertson, J., concurring). Justice Robertson felt that the majority
was wrong in labeling the parents' cause of action as "wrongful birth," as it was more properly
included under simple medical negligence actions because it fit within the standard tort framework. See id.at 925-26. On the wrongful birth claim, he felt Sax v. Vottler, 648 S.W.2d 661,
665 (Tex. 1983) was controlling and found no need to decide whether "art. 5.82, sec. 4 has
legislatively abolished the 'discovery rule.' " See Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 928 (Tex.
1984) (Robertson, J., concurring). As to the wrongful life claim, Justice Robertson argued
that neither public policy nor difficulty of determining damages should bar recovery. See id.at
928. Rather, wrongful life was denied because, under standard rules of negligence, no injury
could be shown. See id.at 928. Justice Robertson noted that "[i]t is not fatal to a cause of
action in negligence that a plaintiff cannot prove the quantum of injury; but a plaintiff must
always establish the existence of injury. This is an impossible burden for a wrongful life plaintiff to meet." Id. at 929; cf Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E. 2d 807, 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900
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lace.' a But the sum of the decision, while supporting a recovery for the
parents, failed to allow an independent recovery for the child as well, which
has been seen as necessary by courts and commentators alike.
1. Possible Injustices in Failure to Allow Recovery for Wrongful Life
Failing to allow a wrongful life recovery can lead to substantial injustice in
many ways. First, there is the possibility that the parents will fail to recover.' 65 For example, the statute of limitations may bar action even after
adoption of the discovery rule, such as in Procanik 66 In Nelson, had it not
been for application of the discovery rule, Mark would have been left totally
without monetary support for his condition since his parents would have
been barred from filing suit.' 67 If damages had been awarded to Mark, the

(1978) (child has suffered no injury cognizable at law); Alquijay v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp.
Center, 471 N.Y.S.2d 2, 3 (App. Div. 1984) (birth with defect does not constitute injury to
infant).
162. See Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 931 (Tex. 1984) (Kilgarlin, J., concurring &
dissenting). Justice Kilgarlin agreed with the majority on the issue of wrongful birth, but felt
that the court erred in failing to allow Mark special damages in the wrongful life suit. See id.
at 931-32. Recognizing wrongful life, noted Justice Kilgarlin, would be in line with public
policy objectives of deterring negligent conduct and insuring proper genetic counseling. See id.
at 935. Wrongful life, he concluded, would ensure that the difficult, yet constitutionally protected, decision whether to seek abortion would remain in the parents' hands. See id. at 935.
163. See id. at 935 (Gonzales, J., concurring & dissenting). Justice Gonzales felt that the
majority was correct in declaring the statute of limitations unconstitutional and also in denying the wrongful life action. See id. at 935. Justice Gonzales urged that questions on the rights
of the unborn should be rethought in a more pro-life manner. See id. at 935. Thus, he called
for overruling of the Jacobs decision and insisted that there be no "legal entitlement to a perfect child." See id. at 935.
164. See id. at 935. (Wallace, J., joined by McGee, J., dissenting). The major thrust of
Justice Wallace's opinion attacked the inconsistency of the majority's decision to allow wrongful birth damages, but at the same time disallow wrongful life damages for essentially the same
injury. See id. at 935-36. Thus, Justice Wallace was of the opinion that Jacobs should be
overruled in order to avoid the discrepancy between the two causes of action. See id. at 936.
165. See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 348 (1982). The court
noted it would be illogical to allow only the parents to recovery medical expenses, saying:
[I]f such a distinction were established, the afflicted child's receipt of necessary medical
expenses might well depend on the wholly fortuitous circumstance of whether the parents
are available to sue and recover such damages or whether the medical expenses are incurred at a time when the parents remain legally responsible for providing such care.
Id. at 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
166. See Procanick v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 762 (N.J. 1984) (parents' suit barred by statute
of limitations); see also Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 665 (Tex. 1983) (parents failed to
assert cause of action within statute of limitations); Silva v. Howe, 608 S.W.2d 840, 842 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (wrongful pregnancy action, statute of limitations barred parents' claim).
167. See Nelson v. Krusen, 635 S.W.2d 582, 584-86 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982), rev'd in
part, 678 S.W.2d 918, 925 (Tex. 1984). If the appellate court and original supreme court
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court would have prospectively eliminated a need for future
action by insur168
ing a child recovery even if his parents are denied one.
Additionally, injustice can result by not allowing the child to recover since
any sum gained by the parents will not necessarily be used towards alleviating the child's difficulties. 169 In most situations, when the parents bring suit
in the name of their child, the child is the party who recovers the damages. 170 The court can then place the proceeds in trust to ensure the child
receives the benefits due.17 1 Thus, a situation is envisioned where the parents have no trust in favor of the child to limit expenditures, and they exhaust the money, leaving the child with no support. 172 Furthermore, if the
parents of an afflicted child die without creating a provision for the child
from the award, the child could be denied the funds for proper care by the

decisions had been allowed to stand, neither Mark nor his parents would have recovered any
expenses necessary for his care. See id. at 585-86.
168. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 440 (2d ed. 1977). Posner suggests
that it is inefficient to make a ruling that will require more judicial time and litigation to define,
when a different ruling can be made that solves the problem altogether. See id. at 440. One of
the major criticisms that can be levelled against the Nelson decision is that it is inefficiently
narrow in scope and will require further suits to test the breadth of its holding, thereby placing
an otherwise avoidable burden on the Texas court system. See Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d
918, 933 (Tex. 1984) (Kilgarlin, J., concurring & dissenting) (necessity of deciding issues postponed by court's ruling in Nelson).
169. See Peters & Peters, Wrongful Life: Recognizing the Defective Child's Right to a
Cause of Action, 18 DuQ. L. REV. 857, 868 n.56 (1980). "No probate court and no guardian
can insure that the money provided for the care and maintenance of the child will enure to the
child's benefit. Arguably, nothing prevents the parents from using that money for their own
purposes." Id. 868 n.56.
170. See, e.g., Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Rutherford, 130 Tex. 465, 468, 111 S.W.2d 688, 689
(1938) (in suit brought on behalf of minor by parents as next friends, minor true party plaintiff); Allen v. Roark, 625 S.W.2d 411, 416 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1981) (if next friends
institute suit on behalf of minor, minor and not next friend true plaintiff), rev'd in part, 633
S.W.2d 804 (1982); Ex Parte Taylor, 322 S.W.2d 309, 311 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1959, no
writ) (child real party plaintiff in suit by next friend).
171. See Robak v. United States, 503 F. Supp. 982, 983 (N.D. 11. 1980) (parents received
reversionary trust for child, payments to parent not made in lump sum, but rather disbursed
from trust account as necessary to meet expenses); Note, Robak v. United States: A PrecedentSetting DamageFormulafor Wrongful Birth, 58 CHI-KENT L. REV. 725, 755-60 (1982). The
reversionary trust created by the court solves two problems: (1) it ensures that the child will
always be provided for, and (2) it ensures that no windfall will occur, as the trust will revert
back to government upon the child's death. See id. at 755-60.
172. Cf Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 18 (N.J. 1979) (Handler, J., concurring & dissenting). Justice Handler remarked that many parents might have serious problems in accepting
the burden that is placed on them by having a handicapped child. See id. at 18. "While some
individuals confronted by tragedy respond magnificently and become exemplary parents,
others do not." Id. at 18. Justice Handler specifically pointed out the Becker case, where the
parents were allowed to recover damages, but subsequently put their handicapped child up for
adoption. See id. at 18.
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workings of intestate succession. 73 If intestate succession takes place, the
recovery could be so divided that it would not adequately defray the medical
expenses incurred.' 7 4 Further, even if a will exists, the child is not an assured beneficiary of the portion of the estate that represents the recovery, as
the testator may disburse his estate in any way he wishes. 75 This situation
could also lead to a child's becoming a ward of the state, forcing the taxpayers to subsidize the negligence of the physician. 7 6 By allowing the child
compensation independent of parental recovery, the court can appoint a
trustee, 1 and
the child need not fear the actions of spendthrift or myopic
77
parents.
2.

Grounds of Criticism of the Nelson Decision

The Nelson court found that similar cases relied primarily on two postulates in denying all recovery in a wrongful life claim. 7 ' The first axiom is
the public policy of protecting the "sanctity of human life," which, in essence, is a decision that life, no matter how impaired, is always better than
nonlife.1 79 This reasoning can be attacked in three ways.
§ 38 (Vernon 1980).
174. Cf id.. The code provides that if a parent dies without a spouse and without a will,
the property in the estate will go to the children. See id.. If there are children other than the
afflicted child, the estate will be divided, each child receiving an equal share, with a corresponding division of any money originally destined to go to the handicapped child. See id.
§ 43. In addition, there is the danger of high estate taxes or improper estate management
substantially depleting any recovery meant for the child's adulthood. See A. CASNER, I EsTATE PLANNING 19-21 (4th ed. 1980). Both federal and state governments place a tax on the
estate left by a decedent, and in extreme situations the amount claimed can be more than the
total value of the estate. See id. at 20-21; W. CASEY, THE TRUTH ABOUT PROBATE AND
FAMILY FINANCIAL PLANNING: HOW TO BUILD AND PRESERVE YOUR WEALTH 13-14
(1967) (independent support of incompetent child essential to assure child's security and to
remove financial burden from siblings).
175. See 1 W. BOWE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 171, at 800 (3d ed.
1960) (as part of estate of testator, proceeds of recovery may be distributed to anyone chosen
by testator because child has no "natural or inalienable right" to take under will).
176. See Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 934 (Tex. 1984) (Kilgarlin, J., concurring &
dissenting) (if something happens to parents, state might have to shoulder support costs); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 495 (Wash. 1983) (burden of care of defective child
in danger of shifting to state); cf Peters & Peters, Wrongful Life: Recognizing the Defective
Child's Right to a Cause of Action, 18 DUQ. L. REV. 857, 868 n.56 (1980) (no way to prevent
parents from obtaining windfall by delegating care of child to state and taxpayers).
177. See Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM L. REV. 618, 639
(1979) (because afflicted child will be actual, if not formal, recipient of any wrongful birth
recovery, no difficulty in allowing direct claims by child).
178. See Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 924 (Tex. 1984).
179. See, e.g., Elliot v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546, 548 (Ala. 1978) (right to abortion does not
mean right not to be born, since latter alien to public policy and state interest); Berman v.
Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 12 (N.J. 1979) (society's deepest belief that life, in any form, better than
173. Cf. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
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The first method is by examination and analysis of Roe v. Wade and companion cases, which provide that parental choice, within certain limits, supersedes any state or public policy interest.1 80 Regardless of contrary
arguments on moralistic grounds, the United States Supreme Court has intimated that the sanctity of human life will not always be the primary concern. 8 ' Thus, it would be contradictory to argue that public policy
unswervingly supports the "high value of human life." ' 2
Further, the recent support of "right to die" cases are further evidence of
a situation where the sanctity of life is not of primary importance.1 83 The
holdings of these cases consistently pay tribute to the significance of human
life, much as do the courts in the wrongful life context. 84 Yet, the cases are
in accord in saying that the state interest in keeping a person alive, in some
instances, does not outweigh the rights of that person to choose death over

nonlife); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900 (1978) (law cannot
resolve issue against uniform high value of human life).
180. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (state may not abrogate rights of woman
to terminate pregnancy during first trimester). The privacy right seen in Roe also extends to
the decision whether or not to procreate. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972)
(government may not infringe upon individual decision whether or not to procreate); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (right to privacy assures that decision to have
children solely in parents' hands).
181. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). The Supreme Court stated, in its
landmark opinion, that while the state may have an important interest in protecting "the potentiality of human life," this interest is not sufficient to overcome the privacy right of a pregnant woman. See id. at 162. Only when the fetus is "viable" does any possibility of a
"compelling state interest" come into play to limit the mother's decision. See id. at 163.
182. See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 962, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 345 (1982) (not accurate to say that public policy, as matter of law, always prefers life); Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d
755, 762 (N.J. 1984) (rejected prior case law decided on policy grounds; familial financial
interdependence and justice require remedy for child); cf Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656
P.2d 483, 496 (Wash. 1983) (award of damages in no way disavows human life).
183. See Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287, 1290 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (plaintiff sought permission to use controversial drug Laetrile to fight cancer), rev'd and remanded,
582 F.2d 1234 (1978), rev'd, 442 U.S. 544 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 937 (1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 419 (Mass. 1977) (guardians of mental incompetent with leukemia sought to avoid chemotherapy treatment, which was
only chance to fight disease); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 651 (N.J. 1976) (guardian sought
permission to discontinue extraordinary procedures sustaining daughter's life), cert. denied sub
nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). See generally Note, Park v. Chessin: The
Continuing JudicialDevelopment of the Theory of "Wrongful Life" 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 211,
222-23 (1978) (right to die cases example of circumstances where public policy can choose
nonlife over life).
184. Compare In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 667 (N.J. 1976) (even under traditional
Judeo-Christian beliefs on importance of human life, death sometimes blessing when compared
with impaired existence) with Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 962, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 345
(1982) (even though society and law place highest value on human life, nonlife may sometimes
be considered better than impaired life).
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impaired existence.' 85 Here again, any argument that a suit by the child
disavows human life is subsumed by the fact
that in other cases public policy
86
dictates that nonlife may be preferable.1
Finally, it would seem to be presumptuous to rule as a matter of law that
under all circumstances life is better than nonlife.7 The Turpin court ruled
that public policy does not demand that impaired life always be considered
better than nonlife.' " Yet, no bright line can be drawn dividing what type
of disability or severity will make life absolutely intolerable."8 9 Therefore, to

185. See Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287, 1299 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (citizen
has right to use controversial cancer fighting drug and could refuse treatment altogether, despite state interest in sanctity of human life), rev'd and remanded, 582 F.2d 1234 (1978), rev'd,
442 U.S. 544 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 937 (1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State
School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (Mass. 1977) (most significant state interest in preservation of human life, but guardian may decide to discontinue medical treatment of ward
even though death results); Eichner v. Dillon, 426 N.Y.S. 2d 517, 540 (App. Div. 1980) (both
common-law right of self-determination and constitutional right to privacy protect choice of
certain death over continued impaired existence).
186. See Note, Park v. Chessin: The Continuing JudicialDevelopment of the Theory of
"Wrongful Life" 4 Am. J.L. & MED. 211, 224 (1978) (analogy to right-to-die cases supports
idea that in certain circumstances wrongful life plaintiff might establish nonexistence preferable to existence). There are other situations where society places the choice of individuals over
the sanctity of human life, for example, "living wills," which as of 1983 were recognized by 11
states. See Comment, Genetic Counseling and Medical Malpractice: Recognizing a Cause of
Action for Wrongful Life, 8 T. MAR. L. REV. 154, 175 n.173 (1983) (recognition of "living
wills" weakens validity of "sanctity of life" arguments). For an example of such a document,
see Note, Statutory Recognition of the Right to Die: The California Natural Death Act, 57
B.U.L. REV. 148, 158 (1977) (living will document, which allows adult to authorize doctors to
withhold extraordinary medical treatment if terminal illness occurs). But see Comment, The
Trend Toward JudicialRecognition of Wrongful Life: A Dissenting View, 31 UCLA L. REV.
473, 495 (1983) (right-to-die cases do not support decision in wrongful life cases that nonexistence preferable to existence).
187. See, e.g., Kelley, Wrongful Life, Wrongful Birth, and Justice in Tort Law, 1979
WASH. U.L.Q. 919, 937 (common sense provides that certain defects make nonlife prefeiable);
Rogers, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth: Medical Malpractice in Genetic Counseling and
PrenatalTesting, 33 S.C.L. REV. 713, 737 (1982) (not invariably or necessarily true that benefits of life will always outweigh suffering); Note, A Cause of Action for "Wrongful Life": A
Suggested Analysis, 55 MINN. L. REV. 58, 65-66 (1970) (whether life preferable to nonlife
dependent upon severity of defects). It has been noted that to conclude as a matter of law that
life is always preferable debases purpose of genetic counseling, amniocentesis, therapeutic
abortions and, further, denies maternal right to terminate pregnancy during the first trimester.
See Note, Wrongful Birth: JudicialReticence With an Emerging Tort: The Negligent Performance of Genetic Counseling, 6 U. DAYTON L. REV. 115, 131 (1981).
188. See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 962, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 345 (1982) (court found
California "Living Will" statute ample support for determination that public policy did not
blindly follow pro-life standard).
189. See Comment, The Trend Toward JudicialRecognition of Wrongful Life: A Dissenting View, 31 UCLA L. REV. 473, 498-99 (1983). One problem with "line drawing" is that the
trier of fact will be forced to define the amount of impairment "that renders a child's nonexis-
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rule that no injury could ever reach this threshold would seem to be error
since it is not difficult to imagine a state 19of0 existence where the pain is so
great that even nonexistence is preferable.
The second argument used in Nelson and similar courts to deny wrongful
life is based on the problem of comparing existence and nonexistence to determine a compensatory damage figure.' 91 This rationale can also be logically and legally refuted. First, several commentators have argued that this
reasoning is faulty because the exact type of comparison is made by judges
and juries every day in wrongful death cases. 192 In a wrongful death action,
the decedent's condition before the accident is compared with the nonexistence at the time of the trial in order to determine damages.1 9 3 A sum, while
admittedly arbitrary, will be arrived at in an effort to compensate the injured
party in some way.' 94 If a jury can decide this type of question, there is no

tence preferable to existence." See id. at 499. This decision is difficult and must necessarily be
a personal judgment based on the facts of the situation. See id. at 499; see also Comment, A
Preferencefor Nonexistence: Wrongful Life and a Proposed Tort of Genetic Malpractice,55 S.
CAL. L. REV. 477, 507-08 (1982) (problem with decisions as to which genetic disorders are
debilitating enough to be genetically screened or to support negligent genetic counseling
actions).
190. See Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 618, 650-51
(1979) Professor Capron noted:
There is nothing illogical in a plaintiff saying "I'd rather not be here suffering as I am, but
since your wrongful conduct preserved my life, I am going to take advantage of my regretable existence to sue you." It may seem improbable that life with burdens is ever worse
than nonlife, but the jury might so find on the facts of particular cases.
Id. at 650-51. Professor Capron then pointed out at length how some genetic diseases such as
Lesch-Nyhan Syndrome make the slogan "life is always preferable" totally untenable and even
absurd. See id. at 651 n.151.
11. See Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 924 (Tex. 1984).
192. Seere.g, Robertson, Civil Liability Arising from "Wrongful Birth" Following an Unsuccessful Sterilization Operation, 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 131, 149 (1978) (wrongful death damages involve same intangible considerations as wrongful life); Comment, A Preference for
Nonexistence: Wrongful Life and a Proposed Tort of Genetic Malpractice, 55 S. CAL. L. REV.
477, 501 (1982) (establishing monetary sum for wrongful life no more onerous than arriving at
damages for wrongful death); Note, The JudicialSystem's Wrongful Conception of "Wrongful
Life" 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 493, 504-05 (1983) (juries must make same comparisons
necessary in wrongful life cases as in numerous wrongful death actions).
193. See Comment, Wrongful Life: A Legislative Solution to Negligent Genetic Counseling, 18 U.S.F.L. REV. 77, 99 (1983) (juries asked to ascertain what loss deceased has incurred
and what deprivation worth to dependents in wrongful death action); see also Capron, Tort
Liability in Genetic Counseling,79 COLUM. L. REV. 618, 649 (1979) (in cases involving wrongful death, nonexistence compared to "normal" condition before accident).
194. See Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486, 492 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (survival action damages have no fixed standard, thus left to discretion based on
specific fact situation); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 comment a (1979)
(detriment in cases of bodily injury cannot truly be measured, so damage award necessarily
only rough approximation of suffering endured).
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reason to deny a similar inquiry in a wrongful life action.19
The logical strength of the court's argument is further weakened when the
court denies wrongful life but affirms a recovery for wrongful birth.' 96
Wrongful life and wrongful birth are essentially the same actions, requiring
the same consideration and elements; they merely have different plaintiffs.197
Texas law after Jacobs allows a court to decide between existence and nonexistence in a wrongful birth action by granting damages to care for a child
who would be nonexistent had there been no negligence.' 98 This decision
necessarily calls for a value judgment on the part of the jury as to the relative
worth of life and nonlife, just as the claim in wrongful life would.' 99 Thus,
because the court allows recovery in certain circumstances, but not under
virtually identical others, the Nelson ruling seems to be inconsistent. 2°"
In addition, Nelson and other courts appear to have placed reliance on a
mistaken interpretation of compensatory damages. 20 ' The courts have reit-

195. See Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 618, 649
(1977) (should not consider problems in comparing existence to nonexistence in wrongful life
as insurmountable when they can be overcome in other contexts).
196. See Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 934 (Tex. 1984) (Kilgarlin, J., concurring &
dissenting) (inconsistent to distinguish between wrongful birth and wrongful life in allowing
damages); id. at 935 (Wallace, J., joined by McGee, J., dissenting) (inconsistency in allowing
cause of action for wrongful birth but not allowing wrongful life).
197. Compare Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (N.J. 1979) (parents claim based on deprivation of constitutional right to seek abortion) with Park v. Chessin, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110, 114
(App. Div. 1977) (child's claim based on deprivation of parental right of choice which essentially caused child to be born in impaired condition), rev'd sub nom. Becker v. Schwartz, 386
N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978). Cf Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 935 (Tex. 1984)
(Wallace, J., dissenting). Justice Wallace argued that the majority opinion was "merely using
the labels of 'wrongful life' and 'wrongful birth,' the meaning of which is the same, in an
attempt to differentiate truly identical causes of action; one which is brought by the parent,
and the other which is brought by the child." Id at 935 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
198. See Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex. 1975) (parents allowed recovery
for economic burden originating from handicapped child).
199. See Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 934 (Tex. 1984) (Kilgarlin, J., concurring &
dissenting). Justice Kilgarlin observed that both wrongful birth and wrongful life required an
election betwen discordant values. See id. at 934. This occurs because the jury in both actions
must compare the imponderable blessings of bearing even a defective child with the unknown
quality of nonexistence to arrive at a damage figure. See id. at 934.
200. See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 348 (1982) (illogical to
disallow child recovery for its own medical care); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483,
495 (Wash. 1983) (no logic in refusing to allow child recovery but allowing same recovery for
parent). But see Comment, Wrongful Birth: The Emerging Status of a New Tort, 8 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 140, 145 (1976). The author felt there was no illogic in differentiating between
the two causes of action since in a wrongful birth action "parents are not placed in the anomalous position of trying to sue themselves into oblivion, as are the children." See id. at 145.
201. See Comment, The Wrongful Life Controversy: Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories and Turpin v. Sortini, 18 IDAHO L. REV. 237, 248 (1982) (no need to restore plaintiff to his
original position after personal injury under compensatory tort law). The Nelson court
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erated that tort law is compensatory, requiring that the conditions of the
plaintiff before and after the injury be discerned to arrive at a figure approximating the injury.2" 2 The Restatement (Second) of Torts, however, provides, in an official comment, that damages in personal injury suits are not
necessarily compensatory because a court cannot, strictly speaking, put the
plaintiff back in his original position.20 3 Therefore, the recovery referred to
as compensatory damages is given for humiliation, and pain and is designed
as a "pecuniary return for what [one] has suffered or is likely to suffer." 2"
The child claiming wrongful life cannot be placed back in his original position, but pain and suffering undoubtedly exist and therefore should be
compensable.20 5
3. Refusal to Follow Recent Trends in Case Law and Public Policy
There are at least two basic tort policies that would be best served if a
wrongful life award were allowed for the child. First, there is the theory that
damages should be shifted to the party that is in the best position to spread

avoided discussion of compensatory damages by merely stating that the "benefit rule" made
the balancing of life and nonlife necessary and that this was impossible. See Nelson v. Krusen,
678 S.W.2d 918, 924 (Tex. 1984). Other courts, however, have considered the nature of compensatory damages and their effect on the outcome of wrongful life actions. See Gleitman v.
Cosgrove, 227 A.2d, 689, 692 (N.J. 1967) (condition plaintiff would have been in had there
been no negligence compared to injured condition as consequence of that negligence). Any
court that bases its decision on the Gleitman refusal to compare the value of life with impairments against the value of nonexistence is necessarily relying on principles of compensatory
damages. The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines compensatory damages as "the damages
awarded to a person as compensation, indemnity or restitution for harm sustained by him."
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 (1979).
202. See, e.g., Elliot v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546, 547-48 (Ala. 1978) (agreed that in order to
determine damages, plaintiff's condition before and after must be examined; impossible in
wrongful life); Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 346 (1982) (in denying
general damages, one rationale was impossibility of arriving at fair sum); Berman v. Allan, 404
A.2d 8, 11-12 (N.J. 1979) (court cannot make necessary comparison between plaintiff's position before and after negligence). But see Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537, 542
(D.S.C. 1980) (in suit by child mere difficulty in arriving at damages should not bar recovery).
203. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 comment a (1979). The comment
provides that there is a difference between damages for pecuniary loss and those for personal
injury. See id. § 903 comment a. Yet, it is acknowledged that the law cannot restore the
injured person to his prior position because "money is not equivalent of peace of mind." See
id. § 903 comment a.
204. See id.§ 903 comment a. The comment further provides that there need only be a
very rough equivalence between the amount awarded as damages and the quantum of suffering. See id. § 903 comment a.
205. See Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 488 (Ct. App. 1980)
(essence of wrongful life is that infant exists and suffers due to negligence, thus should be
compensated).
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the costs involved.2 ° 6 In the wrongful life situation, the physician can carry
liability insurance that would spread this loss over a large portion of society,
thus satisfying this goal.20 7
Further, there is the policy goal of deterrence of socially harmful conduct.2 ° s In cases where the parents' suit is barred, and no wrongful life recovery is allowed, the physician will never be required to make amends for
his negligent acts.20 9 But, if a wrongful life recovery is allowed, the goal of
deterrence is satisfied by requiring the tortfeasor-physician to make all
amends necessary for the full compensation of all the parties involved.2 10
More importantly than refusal to support esoteric policy goals, the Texas
Supreme Court failed to adequately deal with the precedential trend set by
Turpin, Harbeson, and Procanik.2 11 The facts in Nelson are nearly identical
to these cases,2 12 and while the Texas Supreme Court obviously need not
consider these cases as binding precedent, the trend they represent should

206. See G. CALABRESI,

THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS:

A

LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALY-

SIS 39 (1970) (losses due to accidents least burdensome when spread among population and

over time); Keeton, ConditionalFault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARV. L. REV. 401, 405 (1959)
(loss should be shifted to more efficient loss distributor).
207. Cf W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 24 (1984) (doctors
among those best able to avoid and distribute losses through use of rates, prices, and insurance); Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, 38 CALIF. L. REV. 369, 397 (1950) (insurance
has removed fears of overburdening groups best able to distribute costs).
208. See W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 25 (1984) (one
reason for imposing liability to provide incentive to avoid committing act again).
209. See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (N.J. 1967) (even if physican found
negligent, neither parent nor child may recover any damages from him).
210. See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 956 n.15, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 349 n.15 (1982)
(permitting child's recovery promotes "comprehensive and consistent deterrent" to negligence); see also Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 496 (Wash. 1983) (imposition of
duty to child discourages malpractice).
211. See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 348 (1982) (recovery of
expenses for extraordinary medical, teaching, training, and equipment costs); Pr6canik v.
Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 762 (N.J. 1984) (recovery of expenses for extraordinary medical care);
Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 497 (Wash. 1983) (recovery of medical and
special training expenses).
212. Compare Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 919-20 (Tex. 1984) (negligence in testing first child with resulting inaccurate genetic information being given to parents) with Turpin
v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 956, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 339 (1982) (negligent testing of first child
provides faulty information as to existence of harmful genetic trait); compare Nelson v.
Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 919-20 (Tex. 1984) (parents chose not to end pregnancy after inaccurate genetic counseling given) with Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 758 (N.J. 1984) (parents
ignorant of child's true condition failed to seek abortion); compare Nelson v. Krusen, 678
S.W.2d 918, 919-20 (Tex. 1984) (parents sought genetic counseling information three separate
times and on all three occasions were misinformed) with Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656
P.2d 483, 486 (Wash. 1983) (parents sought information as to possible birth defects on three
occasions and were misinformed each time).
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not be ignored.2 13 The sum of the holdings of these cases is that fundamental fairness dictates at least special damages be given to the child, without
the necessity of comparing life and nonlife to arrive at that figure.21 4 Regardless of the alleged weaknesses in their arguments, 2 15 more credence
should have been given to the fact that the highest courts of three states have
chosen to award special damages in situations markedly similar to those in
Nelson.21 6 Thus, Texas makes its stand on case law contrary to the most
recent trends as the chance to advance Texas tort law to meet changing technology action has momentarily passed.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The concepts of "wrongful life" and "negligent genetic counseling" have
only begun to plague the nation's courts within the last twenty years. During this brief time, wrongful life has evolved from an isolated occurrence to a
nationwide debate among courts and commentators alike. The daily progression of medical technology has forced upon the legal system the task of
resolving the attendant problems of this knowledge, and as of yet there is no
philosophical consensus. As it can logically be foreseen that negligent genetic counseling will occur in the future, now is the time to deal intelligently
and effectively with the issues set forth by the wrongful life claim.
The decision in Nelson v. Krusen fails to answer these issues by choosing
not to follow the progressive trends of other jurisdictions. Further, the deci213. Cf Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 925 (Tex. 1984). The court noted the effect

of Turpin, Harbeson, and Procanik by saying "we do not believe that the measure of damages
can be circumscribed as the California, Washington and New Jersey courts have attempted."
See id. at 925. The court cited Strohmaier v. Associates in Obstetrics & Gynecology, 332

N.W. 2d 432, 435 (Mich. App. 1982), stating that damages cannot be considered separately
from the reality that plaintiff would not exist had there been no negligence. See Nelson v.
Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 925 (Tex. 1984).
214. See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 348 (1982) (logic,
fairness, statute, and established principles of tort law allow recovery of special damages);
Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 762 (N.J. 1984) (logic, justice, and prior case law support
recovery of special damages); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 496-97 (Wash.

1983) (special damages not susceptible to impossibility of determination as are general
damages).
215. See Comment, Wrongful Life: A Legislative Solution to Negligent Genetic Counseling, 18 U.S.F.L. REV. 77, 98-100 (1983). The Turpin decision, upon which Harbeson and
Procanik are based, has several weaknesses in its allowance of special, and not general, damages. See id. at 98. One of the most important is that if general damages are impossible to
determine, then it would seem the same impossibility would bar recovery of any damages. See

id. at 98.
216. See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 966, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 349 (1982) (child allowed recovery of damages); Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 762 (N.J. 1984) (child recovers
special damages); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 497, 499 (Wash. 1983) (special
damage recovery awarded to child).
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sion provides an environment in which injustice could flourish by its refusal
to allow the injured child a cause of action. Persuasively reasoned precedent
from prominent courts was available for the Texas court to emulate in permitting a cause of action for special damages to the child, yet the majority of
the court rejected that reasoning. Public policy, as evidenced by decisions of
some of the highest courts in the land in myriad forms, shows that the arguments against wrongful life may be overcome under traditional tort principles and should be discarded. In following this policy, wrongful life should
be recognized in Texas to the extent necessary to protect a child's rights
from the infringement of negligent physicians.
The wide difference of opinion on the Texas Supreme Court shows that
any change of membership might topple the reasoning and holding of the
Nelson decision. With other wrongful life cases sure to soon appear, it is up
to the Texas judiciary to insure that the physically burdened victim of negligent genetic counseling will not also bear the financial brunt of the
negligence.
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